France has stepped up its bombing in Syria, replacing some of the American bombing missions. Russia has unleashed cruise missiles and a barrage of firepower from its fighter bombers on Raqqa, the “capital” city of Daesh (otherwise known as ISIS or ISIL). Although France’s action adds nothing to the existing chaos in Syria, Russia’s does for several reasons. First, Russian bombers do not return to base with undelivered ordinance, as do many of the American bombing missions. Russia shows no restraint. Second, the sheer size of their bombardment implies its lack of concern for the civilian population. By contrast, remember how “Jihadi John” was tracked for several days before he could be isolated in a car and killed by a drone strike. Also, take note of what has been missing in the American air campaign: there has been no Daesh propaganda about civilians killed at the hands of the Americans. The Russians, on the other hand, have taken a different course, changing the rules of engagement. Both France and Russia, each in its own way, are responding to an act of war. America’s air campaign and support for indigenous forces have a very different impetus, namely, Daesh containment while pursuing a diplomatic solution to Syria’s civil war (reference “What Strategy”). Given the evolution of this civil war and of Daesh’s projection of terror attacks beyond Syria and Iraq, American tactics have changed as well, though its underlying strategy has not, at least not yet.

Many in the media and on the opposing end of the political divide would argue that the American Administration is misguided in its goals, inept in its actions, and not sufficiently opportunistic in advancing its position. Stated bluntly—and repeated tirelessly—the “Administration has no strategy.” Actually, what this refrain reveals is that many pundits and political opponents simply disagree with the current American strategy. The reason for this disagreement is the apparent shortcomings of that strategy. A more effective strategy is rarely offered, but is most assuredly implied: an American a/o coalition ground attack against Daesh. The French President seems poised to invoke NATO’s Article 5. Meanwhile, Russia’s President is taking another opportunity to extend his hegemony into the Middle East. The pressure on our President to deploy combat brigades in Syria is growing. The consequent anticipation of war in the American media is growing to a fever pitch. Our politicians foresee an impending crisis, decry the slow pace of the Administration’s current strategy, and demand immediate action. Given history, these Cassandra-like proclamations are often the preambles to war. Even the Catholic Pontiff now warns of World War III.

But cries of war drown out very serious ramifications. How would a new allied army attack and destroy Daesh without contending with the many factions already fighting against the Assad government and each other? Is it feasible for NATO, Russia and the United States to invade Syria, destroy Daesh, and parcel the country like the Allies divvied up Europe after World War II? Russia, perhaps with the help of existing Iranian forces, could form a puppet government in the west, NATO might bequeath the north to Turkey’s administration, and America would undoubtedly advocate for—and likely provide material support to—Kurdish self-government in the east. But would the diverse indigenous population support this arrangement? Sunni’s would not welcome either Shi’a rule in the west, Kurd rule in the east, or Turkey rule in the north. Besides, the presence of an invading foreign military would likely incur the same Sunni insurgency American forces faced in Iraq. In order to avoid this post-invasion quagmire, it would become an urgent necessity to form a Syrian government to reconcile all fractions beforehand. But who could lead this fractious state? And how could any unified Syria afford to reconstruct itself after the horrendous effects of a multi-year civil war and of an invasion by heavily armed foreign militaries. Unless the allied countries supported a decades-long reconstruction, Syria could not possibly survive as an independent country. And it is questionable whether Daesh jihadists in Libya, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and affiliates in North Africa and South Asia would be deterred from future terrorist attacks. In summary, defeating Daesh in Syria may not curtail terrorist attacks prompted by its beliefs; and its eradication from Syria raises many questions that severely tasks international diplomacy.

At this time, Europe, America, and Russia have begun to address the diplomatic questions just raised. The Vienna conference led by our Secretary of State has begun the process. The conference has agreed to the need for a cease fire between Assad’s government and diverse rebel forces. Russia has ordered the immediate cessation of barrel bombs. If all parties in the Syrian civil war agree to a cease fire—which is problematic—then an allied coalition force could presumably engage Daesh on the ground and eliminate its hold on territory. However, this initial agreement would be no more than a temporary armistice. Could it possibly stand the test of time without a resolution of the underlying issues that divide Syria today and without a post war reconstruction plan? Not only do the fighting Syrian factions present a diplomatic challenge now; but their possible post-unification does as well. Will Assad ever agree to step down? Who would fund a Syrian reconstruction effort? Would these various Syrian factions have competing goals? Might the allied forces that liberated Syria also have competing goals? For example, Turkey would like to be in a position to crush any potential Kurdish rebels on its borders. Russia, with Iran’s assistance, would likely demand a Shi’a government over much or perhaps all of Syria. All of its initiatives in Syria intimate Russia would never give up its hegemony there. In large measure, Russia is responsible for creating the Syrian morass. It supported Assad against the rebels from the start. It intervened with a proposal to remove Syrian chemical weapons in order to stop the American President from bombing Assad and creating a no-fly zone over Syria (although Congress’ inaction had the same effect). It not only supplies Assad with weapons, but is now actively supporting his forces against the rebels with its air power. It seems unlikely that Russia would relinquish its foothold in Syria. Even Europe would find it difficult to put self-interest aside. Its history in the Middle East has drained European resources in the past. Why would it take upon itself a long term material and financial reconstruction effort at this time of European economic constraint? For its part, the Administration surely intends to be a fair broker at the diplomatic table; but it is reluctant to commit an American combat force in a ground war. Even if the war drums capture support from a majority of Americans, it seems very unlikely they will continue to support another costly military campaign in the Middle East. Some who might welcome a reversal of the President’s “no boots on the ground” decision, would be the first to denounce him for every setback and adverse outcome of that reversal.

In my opinion, the diplomatic challenges seem insurmountable; but they actually pale before the real problem. As many have said—and history affirms—an ideology cannot be defeated with weapons. It must be refuted. My previous blog on this topic addresses various tactics that may help us contain Daesh and discredit its message (reference “Is ISIL Utopia Dead on Arrival”). The Administration’s current strategy aims at a diplomatic solution, includes some of the tactics suggested in that blog, and encompasses much more. For example, the air campaign coupled with local ground forces has taken back about 25% of Daesh’s conquered territory, has established a safe zone on the Turkish border and a Kurdish stronghold in eastern Syria, has cut off the supply lines between Raqqa and Mosul, has severely damaged Daesh’s infrastructure and oil-based economy, has facilitated the success of rebels in central Syria to destroy much of Assad’s tank forces by means of a largely secret CIA-run arms supply network, and, as a result of the backlash to recent terrorist attacks, has refocused Russia on the Daesh threat and Europe on its security practices at airports, borders, passport controls, and intelligence gathering/sharing. The Daesh snake has been kicked in Syria and is now emerging from the bushes to attack beyond its borders. This evolution of Daesh is consistent with its beliefs. It recognizes no borders. Even if nations unite to squash its head, it will resurrect in other places. To some extent, it already has, in Africa, Asia, the Arab peninsula, and on the European continent. Meanwhile, it incites its adversaries to fight on its turf in Syria/Iraq. The image of martyrdom at the hands of the West it hopes will recruit more Moslems to its cause. Within the territory it controls, Daesh secures its rule by fear, slaughtering those who resist. At this moment, it has killed more Sunni’s than any group in recent history. As unappealing as its fundamentalist orthodoxy may appear to common sense, it has proven successful in drawing tens of thousands of recruits. It may take a generation or more to eradicate its poisonous and barbarous ideology. But that task is what remains for the rest of us. The best we can do is to support Islamic leaders who actively confront Daesh’s distortion of their beliefs and to learn more about modern Islam so that we can contribute to their grievance with Daesh.

You may have noticed that I am now using “Daesh” to describe this group. This usage is my humble attempt to align with Muslims who note that “Daesh” sounds similar to the Arabic words Daes, “one who crushes something underfoot”, and Dahes, “one who sows discord.” Daesh indeed crushes the innocent and spreads animosity, proving that it is not Islamic and undeserving of statehood. The world must respond with a sense of urgency by not only protecting the innocent—including the Syrian refugees—and denying Daesh territory, but also with a concerted effort to refute its message. That refutation must be more than propaganda aligned with our Muslim brothers and sisters. For it must address within Daesh’s recruit population the conditions that allow its apocalyptic message to take root. From what has been reported so far, Daesh recruits seem to be young males, who are disaffected from society and from opportunity. There may be many elements influencing these recruits, including poverty, discrimination, lack of education and jobs, or a sense of moral and spiritual emptiness. If a person is depressed or angry with his/her circumstances, Daesh provides a rationale for taking whatever one wants, for exterminating anyone who might interfere or disagree, and for elevating one’s status to a position of unaccountable power. That rationale is an apocalyptic theology, supposedly blessed by Allah.

We have seen the face of this evil before, in pogroms, crusades, inquisitions, and interfaith wars. For there is no greater evil in the world than that performed in the name of God. It relieves us of an attribute that most distinguishes us from our primate instincts: the individual responsibility each of us has to develop a conscience. No God or Allah will exempt us from that responsibility. Needless to say, Daesh followers have no conscience.

Many have criticized this Administration’s lack of an overall strategy in dealing with Ukraine, Iran, Syria, and Cuba. In general, this criticism focuses on what the President has not done. For example, he has failed to provide adequate military assistance to prospective allies in Ukraine or Syria. He has not committed enough American force to make Iraq’s fight with ISIL more successful. He has not completely eliminated the Iranian nuclear program. And he has not sufficiently punished Castro for the Cuban missile crisis and for making Cuba a communist state. By contrast, pundits and critics have pointed out how successful Vladimir Putin has proved to be in some of these same areas. His militaristic strategies seem to be more effective, though he hardly measures up to Stalin or Hitler. Putin seems content to limit his military ventures to extend his sphere of influence without actually conquering neighboring states. At this point, his military interventions appear successful: witness Georgia, Crimea, and now Ukraine. Recently he has moved to support Assad with Russian military personnel and bombardments from Russian planes and ships. Moreover, he plans on providing Iran with an air defense system. And his military intelligence is now “coordinating” with Baghdad. In Syria, in Iran, and in Iraq he is deliberately interfering or precluding what he imagines might be American interests or plans. His likely strategy is to bind these Shia led governments to Russia, extending his sphere of influence to the Persian Gulf as well as into Eastern Europe. So what is the American counter strategy?

The Administration did check Putin’s attempt to re-engage with Cuba. Shortly after his visit to Cuba, the State Department quietly began talking to Cuban officials. With the Pope’s help, that secret mission went public; and America now has diplomatic relations with Cuba and the prospect of ending its economic embargo. Putin has been checkmated from incursion into America’s sphere of influence. But an American counter strategy to Putin in his sphere of influence is really a question of will and confrontation avoidance. Our President has said he would not get into a proxy war in Syria, though I suspect many in Congress would urge him to do so. In fact, America is already in a proxy war there. He also said that the Russian military risks getting mired into a civil war if it targets the Free Syrian Army, though some in the Administration may welcome this drain on Russian resources. The recent Russian “diplomatic” move to inform Baghdad rather than the Pentagon about the commencement of its bombing campaign in Syria is certainly a snub; but it hardly diminishes Iraq’s dependence on and alliance with America. And Iran is really unaligned and remains a wildcard in the Middle East. Although on the same side as Russia in support of Assad, it has no more regard for Russia than for America. It will deal with both in support of its own interests, but will align with neither. It negotiated with America as the main architect of sanctions and with Russia as a potential supplier of armaments. However, it is not likely to forget that Russia was a party to the negotiations that dismembered its nuclear program and is also a competitor in supplying oil to Europe. Nevertheless, Putin seems intent on extending his sphere of influence by any means available to him. So is the Administration’s strategy to avoid confrontation in Russia’s corner of the world, effectively allowing Putin to run amuck until he sinks Russia into a quagmire of costly foreign interventions?

First, we need to be clear on what should be called a “strategy.” In this context, it has to be more than a one dimension plan to achieve a goal, like a politician’s soundbite: “arm the rebels”; “deploy two brigades to Northern Iraq”; “capture ISIL’s oil fields in Syria”; “bomb Iranian nuclear installations”; “deploy nuclear armed missiles in Eastern Europe”; “maintain military bases in Afghanistan and Iraq for the foreseeable future”; “insert NATO or American troops into western Ukraine”; and so on. The real world context demands a multifaceted strategy that deploys the economic, political, psychological and military resources of a group of nations in support of a desired end. The American led European coalition has already taken up the battle against Russian aggression on its eastern border, not only propagandizing the revived threat of the Russian bear, but also imposing economic sanctions and uninviting the Russians from previously attended diplomatic conferences. But no NATO or American military are deployed in Ukraine. Likewise, the Administration has formed a coalition of more than sixty nations, including the Arab gulf nations, to degrade and eventually defeat ISIL, though without engaging the forces of Russia’s ally, Assad. Both strategies, then, are more focused on restoring peace and stability to Ukraine, Iraq, and Syria than on effectively countering Russia or its proxies. Also, both strategies show restraint in deploying military force and/or in supplying advanced armaments. This restraint and the obvious reluctance to confront Russia are intertwined, for they explain the limited military options in the Administration’s overall strategy. America and its allies in their attempt to address unrest in Eastern Europe and the Middle East are running afoul of Russia’s strategy to amplify or extend its sphere of influence. The question remains how willing is the Administration to confront Russia within its sphere of influence—i.e., militarily.

Some decades ago, President Kennedy was willing to engage Russia in a nuclear war when it endangered America and trespassed into our sphere of influence. Of course, I am referencing the Cuban missile crisis. Later, during Johnson’s Presidency, the foreign ministers of both Russia and America discussed possible tradeoffs within their respective spheres of influence. At the time, America was supporting the Republic of Vietnam against Communist aggression while Russia was supporting Communist North Korea in its continuing battle with its democratic neighbor to the south. In both Cuba and this later instance, the two super powers confronted each other through proxy nations, like pieces on a chessboard. (“I’ll trade my bishop for your rook.”) Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, its Russian remnant is still a nuclear armed nation under Putin, a man dedicated to restoring Russian influence, if not empire. His view of the world seems to be an anachronism of that earlier period, the Cold War. He has tried to align with Venezuela and Cuba in the Americas, but has been thwarted. As a result, he has to play with the pieces within his sphere of influence and counter an American response wherever he can. I think his overall strategy is obvious. But his tactics are opportunistic and, therefore, hard to predict. For example, he quickly volunteered to promote the divestment of Syrian chemical weapons in order to preempt President Obama’s eminent military intervention. He used the coup d’état in Kiev to intervene militarily in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Recently, when Assad’s command was reduced to less than one third of his country, he propped up Assad with Russian forces under the guise of joining allied forces against ISIL. Perhaps there is no effective strategy to stop Putin’s brand of opportunism except military confrontation. The West, under American leadership, is instead focused on the political restoration of the peoples of Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq, while eliminating the destabilizing effect of a nuclear armed Iran. Without the will to confront Russia’s military, how can the West effectively stop Putin’s expansionism or even play in his game.

When I served in Vietnam, I quickly learned how to avoid being stung by a scorpion. If you try to stomp the bugger, he’ll avoid your foot or die trying. In either case, you will be stung. But if you throw a cloth or paper over its head, it will immediately sting itself and die. Russia is like that scorpion. Under Putin’s leadership, it appears already blind to the possibility of overextending Russian resources and destabilizing the Russian economy. Putin cannot foresee and certainly cannot manage the chaos he has stirred either in Ukraine or now in Syria. Meanwhile, much like the weapons race during the Cold War, Putin is leading Russia into potential collapse. The risks he took in Crimea were minimal compared to what followed in eastern Ukraine. The risks he is taking in Syria are of an even greater magnitude for he will put Russian soldiers in the crosshairs of a civil war. He has so far proven right in his estimate that the West—specifically, America—does not have the will to fight Russia militarily outside NATO’s borders in Eastern Europe or in Syria. But his opportunism will bankrupt Russia and further isolate it as a pariah among the nations of the world. The best strategy when facing a scorpion is to keep your distance, blind it—or in Putin’s case, step aside the blind course he has chosen—and let it kill itself.

There is a caveat to what I have just written: nobody really knows what strategies are being undertaken, least of all me. For example, the reference I just made to discussions between foreign ministers of Russia and America was revealed to me in a memo from Eugene Rostow to President Johnson. That memo was declassified four decades after it was written. In the same batch of declassified material from that period was the revelation President Johnson had a back channel of communication with Ho Chi Minh many years before the Paris peace talks were initiated. I became aware of these facts as a result of the research I did for my first novel, “A Culpable Innocence.” My point here is that we have no way of knowing whether the Administration has had back channel communications with Assad or what happened in the private talks between Presidents Obama and Putin at the UN. Was their handshake a public gesture for press consumption or a sign of their agreement on some matter of policy? Maybe four decades from now we’ll know the truth.

To conclude: Putin is already blinded by his ambitions. The chaos he has stirred in Ukraine and Syria is more than he can shape. Though the Administration’s goals may not change, strategies will. What final strategy will win the day is a question still begging an answer.

The current debate in Congress about the nuclear agreement with Iran can be easily derailed for the same reason this agreement required nearly two years to conclude. The problem has to do with the intersection of politics and rationality. The President began negotiations on the basis of his belief that Iran’s leaders were rational. (I have often wondered whether fundamentalist revolutionaries could be rational.) Perhaps what the President meant was that they might be pragmatic when given no alternative. After nearly two years of international diplomacy, there will now be two months of congressional debates. The outcome should be the same, for there really is no realistic alternative. So why have these negotiations and support for their resolution met with such antagonism both in Iran and the U. S. Congress?

Charlie Rose gave us a glimpse into the problematic nature of these negotiations in his April interview with Iran’s Foreign Minister and chief negotiator, Dr. Mohammad Javad Zarif. Like nearly all of President Rouhani’s cabinet, Dr. Zarif has an advanced degree from an American University. So you would expect him to be a worthy and intelligent adversary across the table from our Secretary of State. But, frankly, I found his arguments in that interview not so much logical as cleverly misleading and excessively aversive to slight. The latter observation implies an attitude akin to hubris. But perhaps he was speaking to a different audience. Let me explain myself with the following examples.

Dr. Zarif stated that Iran never had any intention of developing an atomic bomb. If so, why did Iran enrich uranium, begin construction of a heavy water reactor, build out their centrifuge capability, construct a secret underground reactor at Fordow, and snub the legitimate inquiries of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)? His answer was to blame the American administration for failing to agree ten years ago to Iran’s pledge not to enrich Uranium. This reaction is odd since the principal opponents to Iran at that time were the Europeans. In the same vein, if Iran really never wanted to build a bomb, why did it take so long to agree not to do so? Dr. Zarif explained that the length of negotiations with the “Five Plus One” was more about distrust than about the actual intent of the Iranian nuclear program. With the distrust issue in mind, Charlie Rose referenced the hostage crisis of 1979. Dr. Zarif immediately retorted with the American overthrow of the duly elected Iranian government that preceded the holding of American diplomats. So the distrust issue can be seen as mutual. In Dr. Zarif’s estimate, it was further aggravated by U. S. sanctions that began in 2007 and were subsequently conjoined with international sanctions orchestrated by the Obama Administration. “Iranians are rational,” he added, so they naturally react against pressure. If rationality can be defined as reactive obstinacy, then I suppose Dr. Zarif may have a point. But I suspect his rationale has a different impetus.

Charlie Rose bluntly countered with the obvious question, “Was it not sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table?” “No”, Dr. Zarif protested, sanctions had nothing to do with Iran’s choice to participate in negotiations. Iran freely chose to negotiate in order to reestablish its place in the community of nations and preserve its dignity. Given this logic, then it would appear that Iran escalated its nuclear program out of spite for being slighted and agreed to dismantle it only after being accepted as an equal negotiating partner with France, Britain, the United States, Russia, China and Germany. If Dr. Zarif is to be believed, the billions of dollars Iran poured into its nuclear program were invested for the purpose of winning appreciation of Iran’s position in the Middle East. In other words, Iran just wanted respect for, as Dr. Zarif stated, “the U. S. does not respect the Iranian people.” Again, I doubt respect is the only—or even primary—explanation for Iran’s decision to negotiate with the members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany.

Further, some of Dr. Zarif’s reasoning defies logic and is deliberately misleading. While exhibiting the fervor of a true nationalist in his appeal for international respect, he also displayed the cunning of a sophist. For example, his explanation of Iran’s failure to comply with IAEA’s official requests for information was simply that response was not possible. These requests, he asserted, were based upon allegations that were not valid and, as anyone must know, “you can’t prove a negative.” This is a wonderfully circular argument that intimates the questioner must already know there is no answer to the question being asked. In the same vein, he argued that “the U. S. does not have authority to advise others on what to do or not to do with respect to nuclear armament” since it was the only country that actually deployed an atomic bomb. This argument is based upon a false equivalence: the U. S. faced an existential threat during World War II; whereas Iran’s nuclear ambitions confronted no such immediate threat. Those ambitions did, however, promise Iran greater hegemony over the Middle East. Furthermore, if it was ever attacked, the possession of a nuclear response might not only seem enticing, but justified. As a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty, Iran should not willfully put itself in the same position the U. S. confronted in World War II. Dr. Zarif seems to miss the very point of that treaty.

In any debate or negotiation, it is paramount to know your opponent. So what can we learn from Dr. Zarif’s apparent illogic? First, we know from his training and his presence that he is far too smart not to know the uses of logic and its limitations. Witness the actual agreement which is thoroughly thought through on both sides. (Unlike our representatives in Congress, I read it the day it was signed.) The technical and esoteric references in the indices definitely bear scrutiny, but the document itself does credit to the negotiators. Secondly, Dr. Zarif’s defensive stance on issues with the U. S. and the IAEA mirrors official Iranian positions which admit no culpability. More importantly, he seems to be appeasing the hardliners in Tehran. Though the Iranian people want the sanctions lifted, the revolutionary guard and the Ayatollah have not been enthusiastic over these negotiations. In other words, Dr. Zarif was addressing his political opposition, much as President Obama has done when he reiterates that “all options are on the table.” I believe it is likely that President Rouhani and President Obama both believe a diplomatic settlement to the nuclear issue is a better option than the alternatives—even though they both have influential critics within their government. Both men, however, have support from their population. Rouhani was elected to end the sanctions and the continuing conflict with the West. Obama was elected to end our military interventions in the Middle East. The settlement that was reached is quite explicit on these two issues: all paths to a nuclear weapon have been closed for 10 to 15 years with ongoing monitoring ad infinitum; and an exhaustive list of sanctions will be eliminated in sync with Iranian dismantling of critical elements of their nuclear program. The way this deal has been constructed, neither party provided their respective political opposition any other alternative—or, at least, an alternative that its citizens would support.

Given the mutual distrust between our nations, the strength of this agreement will hinge on its execution. The 24/7 monitoring and anytime inspection of known sites involved in Iran’s nuclear program are critical. If Iran is suspected of a clandestine nuclear program, like the Fordow plant, they have 14 days to provide an explanation and allow IAEA inspectors onsite. If they refuse, then the signatories must convene to adjudicate the issue within a 10 day window. The European countries and the U. S. will have majority control over that determination. This provision and the sanctions’ “snap-back” provision are the most problematic elements of the agreement because they deal with the possibility of cheating. Could we have obtained tighter control over this part of the agreement? Perhaps, but, as Dr. Zarif attested, “no country would allow ad hoc inspections of their military installations.” He had a point back in April. During the Rose interview, he reiterated the Ayatollah’s statement that Iran would never agree to inspections of its military installations. By July, the negotiators reached their compromise on that position. Neither party is completely happy with the result. But Congress can help strengthen the West position on Iranian misbehavior. They could authorize the President to use force if Iran is found to violate any provision of this agreement. This authorization could be an amendment to a resolution of approval. The last time the President asked Congress to grant him war powers over the Syrian use of nerve gas, Congress dithered. Likewise, it has failed to support the President’s bombing campaign against ISIL. But maybe this time our legislators will backstop the President’s non-proliferation agreement with Iran for no other reason than he has not asked for anything more constructive than their concurrence. Apparently, asking for congressional support only assures it will not be forthcoming.

U. S. and Iranian naysayers to this nuclear non-proliferation agreement justify their positions on distrust between their nations. But, actually, the distrust exists even more within their respective nations. Rouhani and Obama have steered their governments toward a rapprochement that no one could have anticipated, but that their respective populations sought. Those who oppose them have little knowledge of history. What the Treaty of Westphalia and the establishment of the United Nations established was a basis for settling matters of war and peace through diplomatic negotiations. I believe both Persians and Americans now have a new platform for future relationships between our countries. Given the conflict ridden cauldron of the Middle East, the alternatives are unthinkable.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has a utopian vision of a community established on its definition of Islamic values. But their community will be like no other the world has seen for well over a millennium. In fact, the community they ultimately want to build seems to be not of this world. For their leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, portrays himself as the caliph precursor to that messianic leader (Mahdi) who will lead Muslims to ultimate victory before the end of time. This type of apocalyptic vision is not unusual in world religions. You can find eschatological references in both the Jewish and Christian traditions. Since I am not an Islamic scholar, I cannot comment on the nature of the Muslim afterlife. What I can comment on, however, is the nature of the community they seek to establish in this world. It is a community that seeks to expand beyond all borders and to extend ISIL’s interpretation of Sharia law over all it conquers. This interpretation is not recognizable to contemporary Muslims. For example, ISIL has greatly extended its use of excommunication (takfir). In its most strict application, Sharia law would require a death sentence for any apostate, that is, a Muslim who denies the Koran or the Prophet. But ISIL would dole out the death penalty for many other non-conforming behaviors, to include shaving one’s beard, wearing western clothes, selling alcohol or drugs, voting or participating in a democracy, governing Muslims without the strictest adherence to Sharia law, lacking full-throated support for naming and condemning apostates, or simply being a Shi’ite. The latter sin encompasses over 200 million Shi’a. ISIL’s contention with the Shi’a runs deep. For it believes the anti-Messiah (Daijal) will arise from the eastern regions of Shi’ite Iran and trigger the final battle in Jerusalem where the ISIL caliphate will emerge victorious. Since ultimate victory is preordained, no setback can sway the course of ISIL. Before that last triumph, ISIL interprets the sacred texts to outline another historic victory on the plains of Dabiq (currently a Syrian city under ISIL’s control and the name of ISIL’s magazine) where the “armies of Rome” will be defeated. “Rome” here may be a pseudonym for Istanbul, the seat of the former Ottoman Empire and the last caliphate, or America, the “great Satan.” This projection of America as the “Rome” of modern times is the basis for brutally killing American hostages and constantly tempting the US government to send its armies to fight ISIL. America is being invited to an inevitable defeat at the hands of a preordained ISIL victory. All humanity will then cower to the caliphate and adhere to ISIL’s version of Sharia law. Except for those Christians who accept the caliphate’s authority, possible enslavement, and a special tax (jizya), ISIL will slay any remaining infidels (kuffar). All that will remain in the end is an ISIL community ruled by its caliph and governed by the sacred dictates of the Koran and ISIL’s interpretation of Sharia law.

Before delving further into the nature of ISIL’s prophetic vision of conquest and Islamic utopia, I should note that nearly all Sunni Muslims do not agree with ISIL. In fact, the vast majority of the apostates slaughtered so far by ISIL are Sunni. ISIL considers this genocide necessary to maintain the homogeneity of its community and assure strict obedience and absolute commitment to its world vision. In exchange for this gruesome purge of apostates, ISIL will provide a stable community for its followers, where food, clothing, and healthcare are provided for everyone—and even a job, for those who want to work. The measure of this community is its ongoing conquests and enslavement of the conquered, giving license for its members to fire their weapons in the air, shout with joy, and dance in the streets. The community, then, is defined by its success in battle and the extension of its dominion. Infidels and apostates are the scapegoats for all that hinders or encumbers the community and must be liquidated. As a political philosophy, this type of merciless pursuit of power, domination, and scapegoating is not unfamiliar to the West. It is called fascism. As a social philosophy, it begs the question of what is a community. People forced to live under conditions of strict mandates or be doomed to extermination cannot be reasonably expected to form binding, constructive relations between individuals. The emphasis is on group success in conquest; the individual is immaterial to that end. The governing impetus is fear; the mandated response is absolute obeisance; and the overriding mission is uncompromising preservation of the status quo. An actual community, by contrast, is alive with creative energy where its members actively engage with each other in the development of new art forms, progressive education, and the evolution of support systems and a culture that better serve its general welfare. Amassing people into a closed, oppressive system is not unlike collecting animals for the cages in a zoo. ISIL does not provide for a community, but a collective.

Living a life of strict orthodoxy can be fulfilling if its adherence to rules and ritual is a willing engagement with the inspiration behind those rules and rituals. Out of a period of persecution, Mohammed established a community (the Ummah) governed by a system of jurisprudence to secure the peace and prosperity of Muslims, Jews, Christians, and pagans. Its initial inspiration was for racial equality, religious freedom, uniform enforcement of the law, protection of women, and the preservation of the community. How could anybody identify these founding principles with the ISIL community? It is possible, however, for ISIL to justify its murderous ways from sacred texts written in ancient times. Taken out of historical context and interpreted literally, these texts, like elements of the Christian bible, could be quoted by the devil himself. It is true that Mohammed fought wars ruthlessly to secure the Moslem community. But his community was inclusive and founded on principles of mutual respect and compassion. He also said, if you will forgive my paraphrase, to murder another is to murder one’s self. In another blog (reference “Tempered Reactions to Paris Massacres”), I stated that there is no such thing as a religious terrorist. What I meant did not exclude a terrorist from using a faux religion to justify terrorism. Religion is not and cannot be merely a set of prescriptions that separates humanity into warring camps. Instead, all the great world religions provide signposts to a transcendent experience that brings us in harmony with the ground of our being and with each other. ISIL may be religious in the sense that it clothes itself in the words of the Koran, but it is not a religion. For example, its concept of martyrdom, the suicide bomber who slaughters infidels and apostates, is not a gateway to everlasting bliss, but a meaningless annihilation of being and the spiritual essence of the so-called martyr. By contrast, Jesus Christ, considered a great prophet in the Islamic tradition, gave his life to protect his disciples, not to kill those opposed to him. He died for love of others. All the world religions have love of others or the golden rule of doing no harm as a centerpiece of their belief systems. What ISIL proposes as religion is actually anti-religious. Let’s review its primary proposals. It vindicates its mission based upon past injustices such as the crusades, colonialism and despotic leaders supported by the West. It inspires its followers with the promise of a utopian community under the auspices of Allah. It advocates the establishment of this new community with an urgency emanating from an eminent apocalypse. And so we have an ISIL community born of vengeance and inspired by millenarian fantasy. Its enemy is the past; its future, a new world order—ultimately one not of this world. What is missing in this new community is the present, the world we currently inhabit for which we are communally responsible.

As an American, my analysis is naturally biased. The founding principles of this country were derived after the religious wars of Europe and were based on the principles inspired by the Enlightenment and natural law. The separation of church and state is fundamental to these principles, thereby guaranteeing the ability to practice any religion, free of government interference. On our streets, we can see the hijab, the cassock, the Sikh headdress, or the shaved head of a Buddhist monk. Every American is free to choose a faith and to follow his/her own path to Self-awareness and to the mysteries of life, while governance is left to a common wisdom born of the rational capacity in every citizen. (I could mischievously exempt certain politicians who seem to foreswear common sense in lieu of a voting constituency, campaign donors, and/or lobbyists.) When Mohammed established the rule of religious tolerance, he was recognizing something that is basic to the nature of religion: every human shares the experience of self-awareness and of its transcendent nature. That experience opens us to the mystery of our existence—to God and to each other. It is also at the core of our sense of community—why we feel connected, why we help one another in our daily interactions. Even philosophers, who swear allegiance to no specific religion, attribute human altruism (even Kant’s moral imperative) to an inherent religious impetus. Religion, therefore, cannot be vengeance for past actions or violence perpetrated for future glory. The former is the justification for fascism; the latter is the inspiration of fanaticism.

The seeds planted by ISIL are poisonous not only to its adversaries, but to itself. Of course, ISIL cannot see the root of its own demise. It believes it cannot be bombed out of existence, for any military confrontation serves only to justify its mission. By some estimates, the number of ISIL fighters killed in battle each month is replenished by an equal number of new recruits. Also, it cannot be put down in debate. Its followers are unable to engage in any dialogue for they simply turn a deaf ear to the infidel or apostate whom they consider a non-person. What ISIL cannot do, however, is to create a vibrant community or justify its existence on rational or religious grounds. Brute force cannot create, but only compel. Herein is the fruit of ISIL’ self-immolation, its destructive destiny. So what can the rest of the world do, other than to watch its eventual collapse from within?

Today, the Middle East is a cauldron of suffering masses. Taking the long view of history, we might yet witness the emergence of one of those breakthrough moments, when communities, even civilizations, have suddenly awakened to a new reality. Such breakthroughs have resulted in revolutions, social reconstructions, or a significant evolution in the zeitgeist of an era. It is clear that the Middle East in general is on the verge of such a breakthrough. ISIL is but a cancer that has opportunistically grown out of the civil unrest that exists in both Syria and Iraq. Both of these countries governed inequitably and suppressed large portions of their citizens. In fact, the entire Middle East has writhed with this malady for generations. The Arab “spring” gave voice to this long-suffering. But, if change is on the horizon, it will have to rise from within. ISIL will only prolong the agony. The rest of the world can help indirectly, but not with military intervention or the provision of more deadly armaments. I do have a few personal prescriptions, but they should be taken with an obvious caveat. I am no expert on Middle Eastern diplomacy. Nevertheless, may I offer a few discussion points for the consideration of the more informed:
• In the interest of containing ISIL, shut off its markets for oil and the laundering of money through underground banking.
• In an effort to undercut ISIL’s opportunistic use of tribal antagonism, promote some measure of diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and its Arab Sunni neighbors. A starting point might be with a diplomatic agreement to halt the Houthi rebellion and to negotiate a political compromise for mutual governance in Yemen. Any agreement of this nature could be the precursor to developing some form of common cause against ISIL and an eventual political settlement to the civil unrest in both Syria and Iraq. As long as Iran remains the outlier, not only will there be no joint action, but even the Sunni states will remain largely on the sidelines, allowing Iran to go it alone.
• In order to defuse concerns among the Arab Sunni nations, conclude the Iran nuclear non-proliferation talks as soon as possible and stage a major diplomatic mission to apprise these nations of the security benefits and of the verifiable nature of the resultant agreement. (Of course, this effort depends upon the effectiveness of the final agreement.)
• With the purpose of countering ISIL propaganda, promote the use of social media to refute the historical, religious, and apocalyptic justifications for ISIL’s barbarous, anti-religious actions. The traditional world press has a role to play here as well. An Islamic reformation has been underway since the 7th century, but its nature is hardly referenced in journalistic and broadcast media. The voice of modern Islam has not been heard, largely because Western media has limited its access to the general public as well as to those caught underfoot of ISIL. (Remember what followed Christian persecution, internecine wars of conquest, crusades, and eventual inquisitions were reformation and the ecumenical movement. Islam has long been on this same path.)
• Break the stalemate with Russia over a political settlement in Ukraine. We need Russia to be more constructive in any diplomatic efforts undertaken with Syria or Iran. The Western allies may need to concede some form of local governance in Eastern Ukraine—without admitting Russia’s right to intervene militarily. The government in Kiev has long considered some form of federation, granting more self-governance to eastern Ukraine. More than that concession, the West may have to admit its hand in slighting Russia since the end of the Cold War. Two facts are relevant here: first, the West is guilty of attempting to isolate Russia financially and of allowing NATO’s extension to its borders; second and more relevant here, China supports the Russian position and its actions in Ukraine. This last fact is relevant because we need China, as well as Russia, not only in the “five plus one” nuclear agreement with Iran but also in any constructive diplomatic discussions with the nations of the Middle East. China is now a large importer of Middle Eastern Oil and a growing influence in that region.
• Pressure the government in Bagdad to offer more self-government to the Sunni minority now under the control of ISIL. In order to make this offer real, it might be required to reform the Iraq constitution to form a three state confederacy composed of the three major political factions of Kurds, Sunni, and Shi’a. Under this constitution, the “federal” government would be responsible for recruiting and managing a common military defense force, for securing the civil rights of all citizens, and for sharing resources equitably among the states, including the disbursement of income derived from oil. This political framework was once suggested by the Vice President and rejected at the time for lack of support both within the government in Bagdad and the U. S. Administration. Perhaps now is the right time to re-introduce this framework for governing those pseudo states that are drifting further apart with every ISIL victory or incursion into Sunni territory. Soon it will be too late to win back the Iraqi Sunnis.
• And, finally, we need to tighten our security net against terrorism, starting in Europe where are intelligence support is vital both to Europe and to extending our security as far as possible from our own borders.

It remains to be seen how relevant any of these prescriptions may be. The future is as uncertain as the outcome of the “hundred years” war or the Christian reformation. But ISIL will eventually decay from within. There is no grand strategy to defeat an idea, other than its own refutation. ISIL’s grand idea is dead on arrival, for it is not a vision of a community blessed by Allah and preordained for world conquest. Instead, it is humanity’s nightmare: a vision of dystopia.

According to news reports, commentaries, and “expert” testimonies, the Obama Administration lacks an overall strategy for dealing with the crises in the Middle East. Further, the Administration finds itself on all sides of the various conflicts in that region: America is providing air support for Iranians fighting ISIL in Iraq and conducting a Syrian bombing campaign against the same ISIL that Iran’s ally, Assad, is fighting; at the same time, America is providing “military and intelligence” support to Saudi Arabia while it bombs the Houthi rebels who are armed and supported by Iran. What is even more confusing is the fact that the Houthis vow to eliminate al Qaeda in Yemen, the very terrorist group that our State Department has identified as the most serious threat to the homeland. And our incidental support of Assad works against our stated policy that Assad’s regime must end. While America intervenes in these Middle East conflicts, terrorists groups in North and Central Africa have begun to pledge allegiance to ISIL. And these interventions further complicate our nuclear non-proliferation negotiations with Iran. It appears obvious that the Administration is clueless in direction, without an overall strategy or any promise of a viable outcome. Or so it seems.

Furthermore, critics have blamed the Administration for not supporting the Free Syrian Army sooner and for removing our troops from Iraq too soon. These apparently strategic and obviously tactical failures, they claim, would have precluded ISIL’s success both in Syria and in Iraq. If only the Administration had acted at the most opportune time, it would not be faced with the problem ISIL now presents. Or so it seems.

But what seems to be common wisdom can be questioned. History provides us some context for asking the right questions. For example, how do you pick a viable rebel group amidst a plethora of Syrian factions? What we have seen is internecine battles and much changing of sides between these various factions. Even Senator McCain, one of the Administration’s most vocal critics, had difficulty identifying potential allies in Syria several years ago. He thought he was posing for a picture with leaders of the Free Syrian Army, thereby demonstrating visible proof of potential allies. But one of the subjects in that picture was a known member of one of the most violent terrorist groups in Syria. Further, it should be noted, that we faced a similar choice in Vietnam when we chose our potential ally out of a line-up of miscreants. Our choice was Diem, the leader of a suspect minority that not only created a corrupt government but also contributed to its own lack of public support and eventual collapse. Do we really know enough about the internal policies and affairs in a foreign country to choose the one group of insurgents that will guarantee the outcome we desire? History would seem to suggest otherwise. (Remember we supported the Taliban before they became our sworn enemy.) But perhaps ISIL’s invasion of Iraq could at least have been avoided if only we had left American troops there. Without a doubt, our troop presence in Europe and South Korea has long contributed to peace for our NATO allies and South Korea. However, once again history intervenes—not with a suggestion, but with reality. A troop withdrawal date had been previously established between the US and Iraq; and its Shiite President refused to renegotiate an extension of that date. The argument that the Administration did not adequately enforce its negotiating position may be legitimate. But nobody party to that negotiation has ever made that case.

Nevertheless, our apparent lack of an overall Middle East strategy, military or otherwise, seems to be obvious. Are we really adrift without a paddle? Or do we once again find ourselves drawn into that deadly whirlpool with the same paddle we have used in the past? For many years we supported Middle East dictators who “kept the peace” by suppressing militant groups. Former Egyptian President Mubarak made this exact point when we urged him to step down. We thought we were acting on “the right side of history.” But now, I believe, we are returning to the previous policy of containment and status quo. The circumstances may be different, but consider the similarity in the Administration’s apparent objectives. The US is supporting Iran and Iraq against a militant ISIL in Iraq, assisting Saudi Arabia against a militant Houthi uprising in Yemen, and bombing a very militant ISIL in Assad’s Syria. Are we then aligned with the goals of Iraq’s Shiite leadership that still suppresses the Sunni minority, with Saudi Arabia’s proliferation of radical Islamic fundamentalism and suppression of Shiite minorities both within and without its borders, or with Assad’s tyrannical suppression of any political opposition? The answer is an obvious “no.” But we ARE against the forces of insurgency. For much of our history in the Middle East, we have shaken the dirty hands of dictators and tyrants who have suppressed potential insurgencies. Consider the results when we have not followed this course: our support for the Shah’s overthrow of his predecessor led to the Iranian revolution, decades of theocratic dictatorship, and Iranian support of insurgent groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and now Yemen; our invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Hussein opened the door for al Qaeda, the birth of ISIL, the suppression of the Sunni minority, and internecine sectarian violence; our bombing of Libya not only hastened the fall of Qaddafi but led to the chaos of multiple militant groups, all battling for supremacy and control of the state. This enumeration of America trying to be on the “right side of history” may explain the reemergence of our decades-old policy of supporting the parties in power over the potential chaos of militant insurgents. It appears that we are willing to bomb Assad’s enemies, prop up a sectarian government in Iraq, and restore the Yemen government for just one purpose—to suppress militant insurgencies, whether ISIL or Houthi—whether Sunni or Shiite. Having consistently failed to make the Middle East conform to its goals for the region, America seems compelled to fall back on a policy of containment that relies on oppressive regimes to quell violent insurgencies.

I wonder why nobody else has posited the possibility that there is this inchoate and regressive coherence to the Administration’s policy. Could it be that it is simply easier to criticize than to analyze? If so, allow me to extend my limited perspective to analysis. I think the key to understanding what is happening in the Middle East is Iran. Without Iran and Russia, Assad would not be able to hold onto power. Without Iran, the Houthi could not threaten the overthrow of the Yemeni government. Without Iran, Iraq would not be able to hold its ground against ISIL. Without Iran, Hezbollah could never have risen to ascendancy in Lebanon. Without Iran, the Palestinians would never have had the rockets they hurled at Israel. Without Iran, the Shiites in Bahrain could not have staged a rebellion that only Saudi Arabia’s military intervention could squelch. Iran’s ambitions are driving the course of history in the Middle East. Even its willingness to negotiate the progress of its nuclear program can be seen within the scope of its ambitions. They want to be freed from economic sanctions so that they can continue to finance their growing hegemony and supremacy in the region. Even if the US and its allies are successful in negotiating a verifiable halt to Iran’s capability to build a bomb, Iran will not only be freed of economic sanctions, but will still have a nuclear infrastructure with breakout capability to build a bomb within a specific period of time—perhaps a year as has been intimated. If negotiations fail, Iran will undoubtedly fast-track its nuclear program and will further intimidate its neighboring states. The present course Iran has taken is one that could lead to war, with or without a nuclear non-proliferation agreement.

Once again, we should look to history, specifically European history. There was a reason why very famous European diplomats attempted to maintain a balance of power. That balance was the only way they could contain national ambitions and preserve the peace. In the Middle East, the balance of power is shifting. Neither Europe nor the United States is interested in colonizing or occupying territory there. Those prior actions have been tried to no avail and have only served to stir the snake pit. The only possibility of a regional counterweight to Iran is Egypt and/or Turkey. Recently, Egypt has shown a willingness to intervene in Libya and to assist Saudi Arabia in Yemen. Turkey has been very reticent to intervene, even with the Syrian turmoil on its immediate border. Nevertheless, as I write this article, the Arab states are in the process of forming a joint military task force. War may be eminent and perhaps inevitable, for Iran may be more vulnerable now than hereafter. Currently, they are under the weight of severe economic sanction and without a nuclear deterrent. Should the nuclear negotiations fail to reach an agreement, both Israel and our Arab allies would be looking anxiously at the American President to authorize bombing raids on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But that act could be the tipping point leading to an all-out war. The time bomb is ticking.

And the war I am implying might not be strictly a regional affair. Remember Europe, and to a lesser extent, the rest of the world is dependent upon the flow of Saudi Arabian oil. Most of our interventions in the Middle East have been directly or indirectly dictated by the need to protect that flow for the sake of the world economy. Could America be once again pulled into another Middle Eastern war? Congress seems ambivalent. The President has stated “that all options are on the table” should the nuclear negotiations fail to reach a verifiable agreement. Given who sits in the White House, I think it is likely every possible diplomatic measure will be taken to prevent a catastrophic regional war and, more specifically, America’s involvement in the frontlines of such a war. But it is well past the time for Congress to play a more constructive part. And we may be drawing close to the time for a Presidential address to the nation. Our stance is not unlike America’s before Pearl Harbor. However unlikely an attack on the homeland might be, we do have formal alliances with possible participants in a Middle East conflagration.

America is sinking back into a Middle East foreign policy that attempts to appease the world’s anxiety about the supply of oil while risking the anger of Moslem populations regarding the “Great Satan’s” support of oppressive regimes. And Western nations seem much less willing to use their military to remove Assad, stymy Iran’s regional hegemony or nuclear ambitions, or curtail the Saudi Monarch from exporting radicalism or quelling Shiite rebellions in neighboring countries. The Middle East is now sufficiently armed by the West to carry out its self-destruction on its own. For that part of the world, these may indeed be the worst of times. What lies ahead cannot be predicted: be it tribal warfare, religious strife, genocide, Islamic reformation, proxy wars, or whatever. Europe has seen it all in its own evolution. We are now privy to a possible reprise in the Middle East. Given formal alliances and the world’s commercial ties with the region, will a greater catastrophe be avoided?

World wars have started with even less provocation. Remember Sarajevo.

Nobody questions America’s involvement in the last World War. The justification is capsulized in two words: Pearl Harbor. However, since that war, the prerequisites for American military interventions or wars have been quite nuanced. Now we are faced with another ambiguous challenge in ISIL. The questions this challenge raises begin with the nature of ISIL’s threat and the Constitutional limitations of the President to engage Americans in a warlike intervention of any kind. The latter has historical precedent that is indeed prologue to contemporary times.

When Thomas Jefferson received a copy of the proposed constitutional articles concerning Presidential power, he cautioned James Madison, his trans-Atlantic interlocutor and fellow Virginian, with his concern that the President would have more power to wage war than the King of England. Since his communication with Madison was long distance (he was the American Ambassador in France at the time), it did not presume a timely response. Anticipating a fit accompli, he somewhat mollified his reply by supporting George Washington as the first American President, a man universally trusted. Perhaps, if he had been in Philadelphia that summer, he would have limited the President’s war powers. But if he had done so, he would never have been able to wage war against the Ivory Coast during his own Presidency years later. He ordered that attack without conferring with Congress. In fact, when he finally divulged his decision thirty days after the war, he explained that he had acted to protect American ships in oceans around the world from Ivory Coast pirates. American warships had rained shells on coastal cities in North Africa just like our drones today rain rockets on potential terrorists in Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria.

A key factor for Jefferson’s support of our first Commander-in-Chief’s power was trust. It must be noted that a President is not elected by a single partisan district or state, but by the entire country. His or her exercise of military power must have the trust and support of a majority of Americans. In order to check the use of American power against this trust barometer, the Constitution bequeaths to the Senate the sole authority to wage war. But, as in Jefferson’s time, there is a vague line of ambiguity between the formal declaration of war and various kinds of possible military interventions. For example, in recent times America has been militarily involved in various campaigns such as Iran (1980, 1987-88), Libya (1981, 1986, 1989, 2011), Lebanon (1983), Kuwait (1991), Iraq (1991-2011, 2014-present), Somalia (1992-93, 2007-present), Bosnia (1995), Saudi Arabia (1991, 1996), Afghanistan (1998, 2001-present), Sudan (1998), Kosovo (1999), Yemen (2000, 2002-present), Pakistan (2004-present), Syria (2014-present) and many more military interventions within our own hemisphere. Ask yourself how many of these interventions have been sanctioned by the American people and its elected Congress. For the most part, most Americans are oblivious and Congress, obsequious in its funding support.

Our current President has not preemptively invaded another country, though he has engaged our military in various forms of interventions with his use of air power, drones, limited Special Forces’ rescue or assassination/capture missions. While these interventions have been targeted against non-existential threats, he has used diplomacy and economic sanctions against more serious threats to global security. In other words, his foreign policy seems to distinguish between nuclear or potential nuclear powers such as North Korea, Russia, and Iran and terrorists cults or criminally induced fanatics such as ISIL or Al Qaeda. Given America’s recent war history, this President’s foreign policy, especially as it concerns the use of our military, deserves to be debated in Congress and properly vetted. He has asked as much and, I believe, wants to gain not just bipartisan support but the trust of the American people.

As Jefferson acknowledged, the American President has enormous power as Commander-in-Chief. So any debate must not be afraid to speak truth to power. What we Americans do not want is opposing arguments invoked to gain power at the expense of truth. There are sane, reasonable Senators in Washington who need to speak their mind instead of the dictates of Party leadership. When America opts to kill people in its own interest, there needs to be a clear definition of the threat and of the measured use of appropriate force. ISIL, for example, has no air force and no means to threaten the American homeland except through the instigation of criminal and marginalized individuals. This form of terrorism is not a homeland insurgency and is very unlikely to match the criminal incidents already incurred daily in our major cities. Surely we need to stop its incursion at our borders, to work in concert with other nations to prevent its spread, and to protect our citizens in jeopardy around the world. The threat is real and clearly falls within the scope of response undertaken by past Presidents.

If you are a regular reader of this blog, you already suspect how much I dislike war. Both those who are conscripted to fight and those caught in the crossfire suffer. In addition, war’s impact persists long after the bullets stop flying not only for the survivors but also for the nation states affected. War has unintended consequences. Iraq is a prime example: our occupation policies alienated a third of Iraq and gave birth to ISIL; the weapons we supplied to an inept and disloyal army are now being used against the factions we support; and the Western style democracy we attempted to infuse in Iraq is now the staggering prop of a failing state. The question we never asked ourselves before attempting to democratize Iraq was how to relate to a nation and a people whose history and context we so little understood. As a fictional character from the Vietnam War explained to an American soldier, “Eventually you will learn that you cannot fight ideologies with weapons and that you can only promote democracy in the world by supporting democratic institutions and the right of people to find their own path to freedom” (reference “The Vung Tau Trip,” in A Culpable Innocence). In the end, war is the detritus of our failure to relate to each other.
(For the context of the above quote, click here.)

In our time any reaction to horrific events has the potential to be not only broadcast but also amplified by both the traditional and social media. Even decades ago the media served in this capacity. Rev. King’s march to Selma for justice and Mandela’s efforts for reconciliation were organized media events to awaken the conscience of a broader audience and to win their support. It should not go unnoticed that radical jihadists have the same motivation. The difference, of course, is the message they want delivered and the greater ubiquity of the medium. No ideological movement—not even for Justice and reconciliation—can be won at the point of a sword, as King and Mandela knew well. And though contemporary media can raise the dead with its volume and eschatological premonitions, its effect can become quite intemperate. You cannot shout “fire” in a crowded marketplace without some people being trampled at the exits.

Many feel that the terrorist attacks in France were not just vengeful and monstrous, but deliberately aimed at one of the sacred institutions of Western democracies, namely, freedom of expression. The demonstrations in France and around the world have been large as a result, while also being peaceful and focused. How then could the West’s response become intemperate? My concern comes from the very nature of freedom of expression. That freedom comes with an obligation to tolerate those with whom we strongly disagree. But tolerance presumes so much more: the effort to understand the basis for disagreement so that it can be either reconciled or a path to coexistence can be found. Yes, we even need to understand the assassins and murderers who want martyrdom at our hands. We may willingly grant them that wish, but we cannot lose sight of the millions who sympathize or whose support they hope to win. The widow of the chief cartoonist at Charlie Hebdo recently said that her husband knew of the danger he faced and was willing to die for freedom. I can imagine that the widow of one of the terrorist—who apparently has sought refuge in Syria—probably shares similar feelings about her husband.

If radical jihadists are fighting for their definition of freedom, we first need to understand that definition. It appears that they offer two definitions: amongst themselves they appear to seek defeat of the West and to gain absolute power over all aspects of governance via Sharia law and a self-serving interpretation of Islam; amongst the audience they hope to influence they offer freedom from perceived Western oppression and the inspiration of martyrdom and extraneous quotes from religious texts. The first definition is the logic of thugs and monomaniacs. The West should have no difficulty relating to this logic, for it is just one more incarnation of fascism. Moreover, Europe especially has a long history of wars and oppression carried out in the name of religion. The wisdom gained from this history formed the basis for America’s separation of church and state as enshrined in our Constitution. It also is rooted in French secularism, which Charlie Hebdo so clearly exemplifies. But Moslems as well have long struggled over the same issue: how to attain both personal and religious freedom without resort to extremism and brutality. Radical jihadists’ idea of freedom is equally irreconcilable to our perception in the West as to Islam’s. I suspect the West can add no more weight to the argument against indiscriminate violence and despotism than what already exists within Islam. Practically every major Moslem cleric in Europe has condemned the perpetrators of the Paris massacres and denounced what was done in the name of their religion. I have seen very little reporting on this fact, even though the strongest ally the West has against jihadists is the Moslem community.

The West can counter the second jihadists’ definition of freedom by eliminating the linkage they advance between their actions and the plight of Moslems around the world. The jihadists are not Islamic liberators, but oppressors of Moslems. Having stated that fact does not completely excuse the West from its historical role in dealing with Moslem populations. It may be difficult for Europe to erase their colonial past. And our history with Moslems includes support for oppressive Middle Eastern regimes and engagement in or support for wars against Moslem populations. Recently, however, I have noticed an uneven attempt by our President to relate to the “Arab Spring.” What is needed now is a much broader effort by the Western democracies to constructive engagement. Some part of this effort involves foreign policy, for example, to foster less corrupt governments in Iraq and Afghanistan, to reach some kind of rapprochement with Iran, to encourage a less oppressive regime in Egypt, and to advance more aggressively a two state solution to the Palestinian stalemate. Another part of this effort should involve more immediate assistance to Moslem populations, along the lines of our intervention in removing chemical weapons from Syria, in assisting with the eradication of Ebola in West Africa, or in funding the rebuilding of Palestinian infrastructure destroyed in the recent war. I know our State Department, along with UN sponsored NGOs, have many programs geared to help the health and education of Moslem populations, especially those trapped in refugee camps and Palestinian ghettoes. The problem with all these efforts is the ongoing struggle within Moslem communities to form some kind of political identity that would differentiate them from tyrannical governments AND radical jihadist that seek advantage from their plight. What appears as a likely scenario is a multi-generational struggle to free Moslems from these shackles and opportunists. The West, while it strives to protect its people from the attacks of jihadists, desperately needs to assist Moslems in their development of a more benevolent political identity wherever possible.

There are at least two reasons why freedom of expression is held as inviolable in the West: it is a bulwark against tyranny and the guarantor that all perspectives, religious and otherwise, can coexist in a truly free society. Personally, I believe this kind of imbroglio of wit and passion can only exists peacefully where it leads to dialogue, the precursor to realpolitik and constructive relations. The West should be able to relate to the plight of Moslems around the world by simply recalling its own struggles with tyranny, religious wars, and extremist ideologies. An intemperate response to terrorist violence in France could further damage relations with Moslems and make any kind of dialogue impossible. For example, belittling the Prophet Mohammed would be offensive, whereas satirizing his misrepresentation by jihadists would be revealing. Because we live in a free society, we tolerate opinions that may offend, but that toleration must extend to Moslem condemnation of offensive speech. At best, we can appreciate the difficulty some Moslems will have with our tolerance of blasphemy, for it disregards their sensitivities and disrespects them personally. Every person’s beliefs deserve respect. We learn this truth through dialogue where an understanding of differences can be aired and accepted as part of our common human condition. Without dialogue no rapprochement is even possible. An intemperate response to the Paris massacres could preclude that dialogue and sideline the one ideological force that can destroy jihadism at its source: Islam.

We will continue to fight jihadists on the battlefields of their choosing, but we can defeat them only if we join with Moslems to disavow the jihadists’ moral underpinnings. I cannot deny their belief in a self-justifying ideology, but I refuse to accept it as religion. There is no such thing as a “religious” terrorist, just a wolf in sheep’s clothing or, as Charlie Hebdo would draw it, an assassin disguised as Mohammed.

Satire, if it is worthwhile, exhibits two notable attributes: it is poignant and often funny. Its poignancy comes from exposing an unrecognized and often unwelcome truth to the light of reason. It is the enemy of hypocrisy, sophistry, or other forms of public deception. Its tools of trade include irony, paradox, and caricature. And, of course, it can be funny, though political satire is sometimes more clever than funny. Finally, as recent events make clear, the latter can also be dangerous.

As an American, my experience of satire is largely formed by Jon Stewart. He sees himself as a comedian. But many of his viewers experience his Daily Show as part of the news media. His form of satire focuses on what the traditional news media too often miss, that is, the true significance of a story or interview. And he is very funny, even when his satire is biting. Like Charlie Hebdo, his show incorporates graphics that might offend some. But a good satirist cannot avoid hurting someone’s feelings. Anyone so victimized suffers more from his/her own fallacy than the sharp edge of truth. For the rest of us, we benefit from seeing that the “emperor has no clothes” or that truth may not always be what it seems. I can only remember one instance where Stewart got it wrong. His apology on the air had more to do with his character than his satire. Jon Stewart would never apologize for his satire unless he felt it missed the mark. He is a very responsible satirist without whom we would all experience a dearth of clarity in the blizzard of reported news.

My knowledge of the French language does not go far beyond bon jour and mercí. So I am unable to speak to the efficacy of French satire. Nonetheless, I feel the massacre at Charlie Hebdo touches Americans in a special way. We still live with the pain of 9/11. And we can appreciate the role of satire in a free society, for we too revere freedom of expression. The French, after all, share our democratic values and have done so for nearly as long as we have. So today I gladly expand my meager knowledge of French by stating loudly Je suis Charlie .