France has stepped up its bombing in Syria, replacing some of the American bombing missions. Russia has unleashed cruise missiles and a barrage of firepower from its fighter bombers on Raqqa, the “capital” city of Daesh (otherwise known as ISIS or ISIL). Although France’s action adds nothing to the existing chaos in Syria, Russia’s does for several reasons. First, Russian bombers do not return to base with undelivered ordinance, as do many of the American bombing missions. Russia shows no restraint. Second, the sheer size of their bombardment implies its lack of concern for the civilian population. By contrast, remember how “Jihadi John” was tracked for several days before he could be isolated in a car and killed by a drone strike. Also, take note of what has been missing in the American air campaign: there has been no Daesh propaganda about civilians killed at the hands of the Americans. The Russians, on the other hand, have taken a different course, changing the rules of engagement. Both France and Russia, each in its own way, are responding to an act of war. America’s air campaign and support for indigenous forces have a very different impetus, namely, Daesh containment while pursuing a diplomatic solution to Syria’s civil war (reference “What Strategy”). Given the evolution of this civil war and of Daesh’s projection of terror attacks beyond Syria and Iraq, American tactics have changed as well, though its underlying strategy has not, at least not yet.

Many in the media and on the opposing end of the political divide would argue that the American Administration is misguided in its goals, inept in its actions, and not sufficiently opportunistic in advancing its position. Stated bluntly—and repeated tirelessly—the “Administration has no strategy.” Actually, what this refrain reveals is that many pundits and political opponents simply disagree with the current American strategy. The reason for this disagreement is the apparent shortcomings of that strategy. A more effective strategy is rarely offered, but is most assuredly implied: an American a/o coalition ground attack against Daesh. The French President seems poised to invoke NATO’s Article 5. Meanwhile, Russia’s President is taking another opportunity to extend his hegemony into the Middle East. The pressure on our President to deploy combat brigades in Syria is growing. The consequent anticipation of war in the American media is growing to a fever pitch. Our politicians foresee an impending crisis, decry the slow pace of the Administration’s current strategy, and demand immediate action. Given history, these Cassandra-like proclamations are often the preambles to war. Even the Catholic Pontiff now warns of World War III.

But cries of war drown out very serious ramifications. How would a new allied army attack and destroy Daesh without contending with the many factions already fighting against the Assad government and each other? Is it feasible for NATO, Russia and the United States to invade Syria, destroy Daesh, and parcel the country like the Allies divvied up Europe after World War II? Russia, perhaps with the help of existing Iranian forces, could form a puppet government in the west, NATO might bequeath the north to Turkey’s administration, and America would undoubtedly advocate for—and likely provide material support to—Kurdish self-government in the east. But would the diverse indigenous population support this arrangement? Sunni’s would not welcome either Shi’a rule in the west, Kurd rule in the east, or Turkey rule in the north. Besides, the presence of an invading foreign military would likely incur the same Sunni insurgency American forces faced in Iraq. In order to avoid this post-invasion quagmire, it would become an urgent necessity to form a Syrian government to reconcile all fractions beforehand. But who could lead this fractious state? And how could any unified Syria afford to reconstruct itself after the horrendous effects of a multi-year civil war and of an invasion by heavily armed foreign militaries. Unless the allied countries supported a decades-long reconstruction, Syria could not possibly survive as an independent country. And it is questionable whether Daesh jihadists in Libya, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and affiliates in North Africa and South Asia would be deterred from future terrorist attacks. In summary, defeating Daesh in Syria may not curtail terrorist attacks prompted by its beliefs; and its eradication from Syria raises many questions that severely tasks international diplomacy.

At this time, Europe, America, and Russia have begun to address the diplomatic questions just raised. The Vienna conference led by our Secretary of State has begun the process. The conference has agreed to the need for a cease fire between Assad’s government and diverse rebel forces. Russia has ordered the immediate cessation of barrel bombs. If all parties in the Syrian civil war agree to a cease fire—which is problematic—then an allied coalition force could presumably engage Daesh on the ground and eliminate its hold on territory. However, this initial agreement would be no more than a temporary armistice. Could it possibly stand the test of time without a resolution of the underlying issues that divide Syria today and without a post war reconstruction plan? Not only do the fighting Syrian factions present a diplomatic challenge now; but their possible post-unification does as well. Will Assad ever agree to step down? Who would fund a Syrian reconstruction effort? Would these various Syrian factions have competing goals? Might the allied forces that liberated Syria also have competing goals? For example, Turkey would like to be in a position to crush any potential Kurdish rebels on its borders. Russia, with Iran’s assistance, would likely demand a Shi’a government over much or perhaps all of Syria. All of its initiatives in Syria intimate Russia would never give up its hegemony there. In large measure, Russia is responsible for creating the Syrian morass. It supported Assad against the rebels from the start. It intervened with a proposal to remove Syrian chemical weapons in order to stop the American President from bombing Assad and creating a no-fly zone over Syria (although Congress’ inaction had the same effect). It not only supplies Assad with weapons, but is now actively supporting his forces against the rebels with its air power. It seems unlikely that Russia would relinquish its foothold in Syria. Even Europe would find it difficult to put self-interest aside. Its history in the Middle East has drained European resources in the past. Why would it take upon itself a long term material and financial reconstruction effort at this time of European economic constraint? For its part, the Administration surely intends to be a fair broker at the diplomatic table; but it is reluctant to commit an American combat force in a ground war. Even if the war drums capture support from a majority of Americans, it seems very unlikely they will continue to support another costly military campaign in the Middle East. Some who might welcome a reversal of the President’s “no boots on the ground” decision, would be the first to denounce him for every setback and adverse outcome of that reversal.

In my opinion, the diplomatic challenges seem insurmountable; but they actually pale before the real problem. As many have said—and history affirms—an ideology cannot be defeated with weapons. It must be refuted. My previous blog on this topic addresses various tactics that may help us contain Daesh and discredit its message (reference “Is ISIL Utopia Dead on Arrival”). The Administration’s current strategy aims at a diplomatic solution, includes some of the tactics suggested in that blog, and encompasses much more. For example, the air campaign coupled with local ground forces has taken back about 25% of Daesh’s conquered territory, has established a safe zone on the Turkish border and a Kurdish stronghold in eastern Syria, has cut off the supply lines between Raqqa and Mosul, has severely damaged Daesh’s infrastructure and oil-based economy, has facilitated the success of rebels in central Syria to destroy much of Assad’s tank forces by means of a largely secret CIA-run arms supply network, and, as a result of the backlash to recent terrorist attacks, has refocused Russia on the Daesh threat and Europe on its security practices at airports, borders, passport controls, and intelligence gathering/sharing. The Daesh snake has been kicked in Syria and is now emerging from the bushes to attack beyond its borders. This evolution of Daesh is consistent with its beliefs. It recognizes no borders. Even if nations unite to squash its head, it will resurrect in other places. To some extent, it already has, in Africa, Asia, the Arab peninsula, and on the European continent. Meanwhile, it incites its adversaries to fight on its turf in Syria/Iraq. The image of martyrdom at the hands of the West it hopes will recruit more Moslems to its cause. Within the territory it controls, Daesh secures its rule by fear, slaughtering those who resist. At this moment, it has killed more Sunni’s than any group in recent history. As unappealing as its fundamentalist orthodoxy may appear to common sense, it has proven successful in drawing tens of thousands of recruits. It may take a generation or more to eradicate its poisonous and barbarous ideology. But that task is what remains for the rest of us. The best we can do is to support Islamic leaders who actively confront Daesh’s distortion of their beliefs and to learn more about modern Islam so that we can contribute to their grievance with Daesh.

You may have noticed that I am now using “Daesh” to describe this group. This usage is my humble attempt to align with Muslims who note that “Daesh” sounds similar to the Arabic words Daes, “one who crushes something underfoot”, and Dahes, “one who sows discord.” Daesh indeed crushes the innocent and spreads animosity, proving that it is not Islamic and undeserving of statehood. The world must respond with a sense of urgency by not only protecting the innocent—including the Syrian refugees—and denying Daesh territory, but also with a concerted effort to refute its message. That refutation must be more than propaganda aligned with our Muslim brothers and sisters. For it must address within Daesh’s recruit population the conditions that allow its apocalyptic message to take root. From what has been reported so far, Daesh recruits seem to be young males, who are disaffected from society and from opportunity. There may be many elements influencing these recruits, including poverty, discrimination, lack of education and jobs, or a sense of moral and spiritual emptiness. If a person is depressed or angry with his/her circumstances, Daesh provides a rationale for taking whatever one wants, for exterminating anyone who might interfere or disagree, and for elevating one’s status to a position of unaccountable power. That rationale is an apocalyptic theology, supposedly blessed by Allah.

We have seen the face of this evil before, in pogroms, crusades, inquisitions, and interfaith wars. For there is no greater evil in the world than that performed in the name of God. It relieves us of an attribute that most distinguishes us from our primate instincts: the individual responsibility each of us has to develop a conscience. No God or Allah will exempt us from that responsibility. Needless to say, Daesh followers have no conscience.