According to news reports, commentaries, and “expert” testimonies, the Obama Administration lacks an overall strategy for dealing with the crises in the Middle East. Further, the Administration finds itself on all sides of the various conflicts in that region: America is providing air support for Iranians fighting ISIL in Iraq and conducting a Syrian bombing campaign against the same ISIL that Iran’s ally, Assad, is fighting; at the same time, America is providing “military and intelligence” support to Saudi Arabia while it bombs the Houthi rebels who are armed and supported by Iran. What is even more confusing is the fact that the Houthis vow to eliminate al Qaeda in Yemen, the very terrorist group that our State Department has identified as the most serious threat to the homeland. And our incidental support of Assad works against our stated policy that Assad’s regime must end. While America intervenes in these Middle East conflicts, terrorists groups in North and Central Africa have begun to pledge allegiance to ISIL. And these interventions further complicate our nuclear non-proliferation negotiations with Iran. It appears obvious that the Administration is clueless in direction, without an overall strategy or any promise of a viable outcome. Or so it seems.

Furthermore, critics have blamed the Administration for not supporting the Free Syrian Army sooner and for removing our troops from Iraq too soon. These apparently strategic and obviously tactical failures, they claim, would have precluded ISIL’s success both in Syria and in Iraq. If only the Administration had acted at the most opportune time, it would not be faced with the problem ISIL now presents. Or so it seems.

But what seems to be common wisdom can be questioned. History provides us some context for asking the right questions. For example, how do you pick a viable rebel group amidst a plethora of Syrian factions? What we have seen is internecine battles and much changing of sides between these various factions. Even Senator McCain, one of the Administration’s most vocal critics, had difficulty identifying potential allies in Syria several years ago. He thought he was posing for a picture with leaders of the Free Syrian Army, thereby demonstrating visible proof of potential allies. But one of the subjects in that picture was a known member of one of the most violent terrorist groups in Syria. Further, it should be noted, that we faced a similar choice in Vietnam when we chose our potential ally out of a line-up of miscreants. Our choice was Diem, the leader of a suspect minority that not only created a corrupt government but also contributed to its own lack of public support and eventual collapse. Do we really know enough about the internal policies and affairs in a foreign country to choose the one group of insurgents that will guarantee the outcome we desire? History would seem to suggest otherwise. (Remember we supported the Taliban before they became our sworn enemy.) But perhaps ISIL’s invasion of Iraq could at least have been avoided if only we had left American troops there. Without a doubt, our troop presence in Europe and South Korea has long contributed to peace for our NATO allies and South Korea. However, once again history intervenes—not with a suggestion, but with reality. A troop withdrawal date had been previously established between the US and Iraq; and its Shiite President refused to renegotiate an extension of that date. The argument that the Administration did not adequately enforce its negotiating position may be legitimate. But nobody party to that negotiation has ever made that case.

Nevertheless, our apparent lack of an overall Middle East strategy, military or otherwise, seems to be obvious. Are we really adrift without a paddle? Or do we once again find ourselves drawn into that deadly whirlpool with the same paddle we have used in the past? For many years we supported Middle East dictators who “kept the peace” by suppressing militant groups. Former Egyptian President Mubarak made this exact point when we urged him to step down. We thought we were acting on “the right side of history.” But now, I believe, we are returning to the previous policy of containment and status quo. The circumstances may be different, but consider the similarity in the Administration’s apparent objectives. The US is supporting Iran and Iraq against a militant ISIL in Iraq, assisting Saudi Arabia against a militant Houthi uprising in Yemen, and bombing a very militant ISIL in Assad’s Syria. Are we then aligned with the goals of Iraq’s Shiite leadership that still suppresses the Sunni minority, with Saudi Arabia’s proliferation of radical Islamic fundamentalism and suppression of Shiite minorities both within and without its borders, or with Assad’s tyrannical suppression of any political opposition? The answer is an obvious “no.” But we ARE against the forces of insurgency. For much of our history in the Middle East, we have shaken the dirty hands of dictators and tyrants who have suppressed potential insurgencies. Consider the results when we have not followed this course: our support for the Shah’s overthrow of his predecessor led to the Iranian revolution, decades of theocratic dictatorship, and Iranian support of insurgent groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and now Yemen; our invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Hussein opened the door for al Qaeda, the birth of ISIL, the suppression of the Sunni minority, and internecine sectarian violence; our bombing of Libya not only hastened the fall of Qaddafi but led to the chaos of multiple militant groups, all battling for supremacy and control of the state. This enumeration of America trying to be on the “right side of history” may explain the reemergence of our decades-old policy of supporting the parties in power over the potential chaos of militant insurgents. It appears that we are willing to bomb Assad’s enemies, prop up a sectarian government in Iraq, and restore the Yemen government for just one purpose—to suppress militant insurgencies, whether ISIL or Houthi—whether Sunni or Shiite. Having consistently failed to make the Middle East conform to its goals for the region, America seems compelled to fall back on a policy of containment that relies on oppressive regimes to quell violent insurgencies.

I wonder why nobody else has posited the possibility that there is this inchoate and regressive coherence to the Administration’s policy. Could it be that it is simply easier to criticize than to analyze? If so, allow me to extend my limited perspective to analysis. I think the key to understanding what is happening in the Middle East is Iran. Without Iran and Russia, Assad would not be able to hold onto power. Without Iran, the Houthi could not threaten the overthrow of the Yemeni government. Without Iran, Iraq would not be able to hold its ground against ISIL. Without Iran, Hezbollah could never have risen to ascendancy in Lebanon. Without Iran, the Palestinians would never have had the rockets they hurled at Israel. Without Iran, the Shiites in Bahrain could not have staged a rebellion that only Saudi Arabia’s military intervention could squelch. Iran’s ambitions are driving the course of history in the Middle East. Even its willingness to negotiate the progress of its nuclear program can be seen within the scope of its ambitions. They want to be freed from economic sanctions so that they can continue to finance their growing hegemony and supremacy in the region. Even if the US and its allies are successful in negotiating a verifiable halt to Iran’s capability to build a bomb, Iran will not only be freed of economic sanctions, but will still have a nuclear infrastructure with breakout capability to build a bomb within a specific period of time—perhaps a year as has been intimated. If negotiations fail, Iran will undoubtedly fast-track its nuclear program and will further intimidate its neighboring states. The present course Iran has taken is one that could lead to war, with or without a nuclear non-proliferation agreement.

Once again, we should look to history, specifically European history. There was a reason why very famous European diplomats attempted to maintain a balance of power. That balance was the only way they could contain national ambitions and preserve the peace. In the Middle East, the balance of power is shifting. Neither Europe nor the United States is interested in colonizing or occupying territory there. Those prior actions have been tried to no avail and have only served to stir the snake pit. The only possibility of a regional counterweight to Iran is Egypt and/or Turkey. Recently, Egypt has shown a willingness to intervene in Libya and to assist Saudi Arabia in Yemen. Turkey has been very reticent to intervene, even with the Syrian turmoil on its immediate border. Nevertheless, as I write this article, the Arab states are in the process of forming a joint military task force. War may be eminent and perhaps inevitable, for Iran may be more vulnerable now than hereafter. Currently, they are under the weight of severe economic sanction and without a nuclear deterrent. Should the nuclear negotiations fail to reach an agreement, both Israel and our Arab allies would be looking anxiously at the American President to authorize bombing raids on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But that act could be the tipping point leading to an all-out war. The time bomb is ticking.

And the war I am implying might not be strictly a regional affair. Remember Europe, and to a lesser extent, the rest of the world is dependent upon the flow of Saudi Arabian oil. Most of our interventions in the Middle East have been directly or indirectly dictated by the need to protect that flow for the sake of the world economy. Could America be once again pulled into another Middle Eastern war? Congress seems ambivalent. The President has stated “that all options are on the table” should the nuclear negotiations fail to reach a verifiable agreement. Given who sits in the White House, I think it is likely every possible diplomatic measure will be taken to prevent a catastrophic regional war and, more specifically, America’s involvement in the frontlines of such a war. But it is well past the time for Congress to play a more constructive part. And we may be drawing close to the time for a Presidential address to the nation. Our stance is not unlike America’s before Pearl Harbor. However unlikely an attack on the homeland might be, we do have formal alliances with possible participants in a Middle East conflagration.

America is sinking back into a Middle East foreign policy that attempts to appease the world’s anxiety about the supply of oil while risking the anger of Moslem populations regarding the “Great Satan’s” support of oppressive regimes. And Western nations seem much less willing to use their military to remove Assad, stymy Iran’s regional hegemony or nuclear ambitions, or curtail the Saudi Monarch from exporting radicalism or quelling Shiite rebellions in neighboring countries. The Middle East is now sufficiently armed by the West to carry out its self-destruction on its own. For that part of the world, these may indeed be the worst of times. What lies ahead cannot be predicted: be it tribal warfare, religious strife, genocide, Islamic reformation, proxy wars, or whatever. Europe has seen it all in its own evolution. We are now privy to a possible reprise in the Middle East. Given formal alliances and the world’s commercial ties with the region, will a greater catastrophe be avoided?

World wars have started with even less provocation. Remember Sarajevo.