The current debate in Congress about the nuclear agreement with Iran can be easily derailed for the same reason this agreement required nearly two years to conclude. The problem has to do with the intersection of politics and rationality. The President began negotiations on the basis of his belief that Iran’s leaders were rational. (I have often wondered whether fundamentalist revolutionaries could be rational.) Perhaps what the President meant was that they might be pragmatic when given no alternative. After nearly two years of international diplomacy, there will now be two months of congressional debates. The outcome should be the same, for there really is no realistic alternative. So why have these negotiations and support for their resolution met with such antagonism both in Iran and the U. S. Congress?

Charlie Rose gave us a glimpse into the problematic nature of these negotiations in his April interview with Iran’s Foreign Minister and chief negotiator, Dr. Mohammad Javad Zarif. Like nearly all of President Rouhani’s cabinet, Dr. Zarif has an advanced degree from an American University. So you would expect him to be a worthy and intelligent adversary across the table from our Secretary of State. But, frankly, I found his arguments in that interview not so much logical as cleverly misleading and excessively aversive to slight. The latter observation implies an attitude akin to hubris. But perhaps he was speaking to a different audience. Let me explain myself with the following examples.

Dr. Zarif stated that Iran never had any intention of developing an atomic bomb. If so, why did Iran enrich uranium, begin construction of a heavy water reactor, build out their centrifuge capability, construct a secret underground reactor at Fordow, and snub the legitimate inquiries of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)? His answer was to blame the American administration for failing to agree ten years ago to Iran’s pledge not to enrich Uranium. This reaction is odd since the principal opponents to Iran at that time were the Europeans. In the same vein, if Iran really never wanted to build a bomb, why did it take so long to agree not to do so? Dr. Zarif explained that the length of negotiations with the “Five Plus One” was more about distrust than about the actual intent of the Iranian nuclear program. With the distrust issue in mind, Charlie Rose referenced the hostage crisis of 1979. Dr. Zarif immediately retorted with the American overthrow of the duly elected Iranian government that preceded the holding of American diplomats. So the distrust issue can be seen as mutual. In Dr. Zarif’s estimate, it was further aggravated by U. S. sanctions that began in 2007 and were subsequently conjoined with international sanctions orchestrated by the Obama Administration. “Iranians are rational,” he added, so they naturally react against pressure. If rationality can be defined as reactive obstinacy, then I suppose Dr. Zarif may have a point. But I suspect his rationale has a different impetus.

Charlie Rose bluntly countered with the obvious question, “Was it not sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table?” “No”, Dr. Zarif protested, sanctions had nothing to do with Iran’s choice to participate in negotiations. Iran freely chose to negotiate in order to reestablish its place in the community of nations and preserve its dignity. Given this logic, then it would appear that Iran escalated its nuclear program out of spite for being slighted and agreed to dismantle it only after being accepted as an equal negotiating partner with France, Britain, the United States, Russia, China and Germany. If Dr. Zarif is to be believed, the billions of dollars Iran poured into its nuclear program were invested for the purpose of winning appreciation of Iran’s position in the Middle East. In other words, Iran just wanted respect for, as Dr. Zarif stated, “the U. S. does not respect the Iranian people.” Again, I doubt respect is the only—or even primary—explanation for Iran’s decision to negotiate with the members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany.

Further, some of Dr. Zarif’s reasoning defies logic and is deliberately misleading. While exhibiting the fervor of a true nationalist in his appeal for international respect, he also displayed the cunning of a sophist. For example, his explanation of Iran’s failure to comply with IAEA’s official requests for information was simply that response was not possible. These requests, he asserted, were based upon allegations that were not valid and, as anyone must know, “you can’t prove a negative.” This is a wonderfully circular argument that intimates the questioner must already know there is no answer to the question being asked. In the same vein, he argued that “the U. S. does not have authority to advise others on what to do or not to do with respect to nuclear armament” since it was the only country that actually deployed an atomic bomb. This argument is based upon a false equivalence: the U. S. faced an existential threat during World War II; whereas Iran’s nuclear ambitions confronted no such immediate threat. Those ambitions did, however, promise Iran greater hegemony over the Middle East. Furthermore, if it was ever attacked, the possession of a nuclear response might not only seem enticing, but justified. As a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty, Iran should not willfully put itself in the same position the U. S. confronted in World War II. Dr. Zarif seems to miss the very point of that treaty.

In any debate or negotiation, it is paramount to know your opponent. So what can we learn from Dr. Zarif’s apparent illogic? First, we know from his training and his presence that he is far too smart not to know the uses of logic and its limitations. Witness the actual agreement which is thoroughly thought through on both sides. (Unlike our representatives in Congress, I read it the day it was signed.) The technical and esoteric references in the indices definitely bear scrutiny, but the document itself does credit to the negotiators. Secondly, Dr. Zarif’s defensive stance on issues with the U. S. and the IAEA mirrors official Iranian positions which admit no culpability. More importantly, he seems to be appeasing the hardliners in Tehran. Though the Iranian people want the sanctions lifted, the revolutionary guard and the Ayatollah have not been enthusiastic over these negotiations. In other words, Dr. Zarif was addressing his political opposition, much as President Obama has done when he reiterates that “all options are on the table.” I believe it is likely that President Rouhani and President Obama both believe a diplomatic settlement to the nuclear issue is a better option than the alternatives—even though they both have influential critics within their government. Both men, however, have support from their population. Rouhani was elected to end the sanctions and the continuing conflict with the West. Obama was elected to end our military interventions in the Middle East. The settlement that was reached is quite explicit on these two issues: all paths to a nuclear weapon have been closed for 10 to 15 years with ongoing monitoring ad infinitum; and an exhaustive list of sanctions will be eliminated in sync with Iranian dismantling of critical elements of their nuclear program. The way this deal has been constructed, neither party provided their respective political opposition any other alternative—or, at least, an alternative that its citizens would support.

Given the mutual distrust between our nations, the strength of this agreement will hinge on its execution. The 24/7 monitoring and anytime inspection of known sites involved in Iran’s nuclear program are critical. If Iran is suspected of a clandestine nuclear program, like the Fordow plant, they have 14 days to provide an explanation and allow IAEA inspectors onsite. If they refuse, then the signatories must convene to adjudicate the issue within a 10 day window. The European countries and the U. S. will have majority control over that determination. This provision and the sanctions’ “snap-back” provision are the most problematic elements of the agreement because they deal with the possibility of cheating. Could we have obtained tighter control over this part of the agreement? Perhaps, but, as Dr. Zarif attested, “no country would allow ad hoc inspections of their military installations.” He had a point back in April. During the Rose interview, he reiterated the Ayatollah’s statement that Iran would never agree to inspections of its military installations. By July, the negotiators reached their compromise on that position. Neither party is completely happy with the result. But Congress can help strengthen the West position on Iranian misbehavior. They could authorize the President to use force if Iran is found to violate any provision of this agreement. This authorization could be an amendment to a resolution of approval. The last time the President asked Congress to grant him war powers over the Syrian use of nerve gas, Congress dithered. Likewise, it has failed to support the President’s bombing campaign against ISIL. But maybe this time our legislators will backstop the President’s non-proliferation agreement with Iran for no other reason than he has not asked for anything more constructive than their concurrence. Apparently, asking for congressional support only assures it will not be forthcoming.

U. S. and Iranian naysayers to this nuclear non-proliferation agreement justify their positions on distrust between their nations. But, actually, the distrust exists even more within their respective nations. Rouhani and Obama have steered their governments toward a rapprochement that no one could have anticipated, but that their respective populations sought. Those who oppose them have little knowledge of history. What the Treaty of Westphalia and the establishment of the United Nations established was a basis for settling matters of war and peace through diplomatic negotiations. I believe both Persians and Americans now have a new platform for future relationships between our countries. Given the conflict ridden cauldron of the Middle East, the alternatives are unthinkable.