Many have criticized this Administration’s lack of an overall strategy in dealing with Ukraine, Iran, Syria, and Cuba. In general, this criticism focuses on what the President has not done. For example, he has failed to provide adequate military assistance to prospective allies in Ukraine or Syria. He has not committed enough American force to make Iraq’s fight with ISIL more successful. He has not completely eliminated the Iranian nuclear program. And he has not sufficiently punished Castro for the Cuban missile crisis and for making Cuba a communist state. By contrast, pundits and critics have pointed out how successful Vladimir Putin has proved to be in some of these same areas. His militaristic strategies seem to be more effective, though he hardly measures up to Stalin or Hitler. Putin seems content to limit his military ventures to extend his sphere of influence without actually conquering neighboring states. At this point, his military interventions appear successful: witness Georgia, Crimea, and now Ukraine. Recently he has moved to support Assad with Russian military personnel and bombardments from Russian planes and ships. Moreover, he plans on providing Iran with an air defense system. And his military intelligence is now “coordinating” with Baghdad. In Syria, in Iran, and in Iraq he is deliberately interfering or precluding what he imagines might be American interests or plans. His likely strategy is to bind these Shia led governments to Russia, extending his sphere of influence to the Persian Gulf as well as into Eastern Europe. So what is the American counter strategy?

The Administration did check Putin’s attempt to re-engage with Cuba. Shortly after his visit to Cuba, the State Department quietly began talking to Cuban officials. With the Pope’s help, that secret mission went public; and America now has diplomatic relations with Cuba and the prospect of ending its economic embargo. Putin has been checkmated from incursion into America’s sphere of influence. But an American counter strategy to Putin in his sphere of influence is really a question of will and confrontation avoidance. Our President has said he would not get into a proxy war in Syria, though I suspect many in Congress would urge him to do so. In fact, America is already in a proxy war there. He also said that the Russian military risks getting mired into a civil war if it targets the Free Syrian Army, though some in the Administration may welcome this drain on Russian resources. The recent Russian “diplomatic” move to inform Baghdad rather than the Pentagon about the commencement of its bombing campaign in Syria is certainly a snub; but it hardly diminishes Iraq’s dependence on and alliance with America. And Iran is really unaligned and remains a wildcard in the Middle East. Although on the same side as Russia in support of Assad, it has no more regard for Russia than for America. It will deal with both in support of its own interests, but will align with neither. It negotiated with America as the main architect of sanctions and with Russia as a potential supplier of armaments. However, it is not likely to forget that Russia was a party to the negotiations that dismembered its nuclear program and is also a competitor in supplying oil to Europe. Nevertheless, Putin seems intent on extending his sphere of influence by any means available to him. So is the Administration’s strategy to avoid confrontation in Russia’s corner of the world, effectively allowing Putin to run amuck until he sinks Russia into a quagmire of costly foreign interventions?

First, we need to be clear on what should be called a “strategy.” In this context, it has to be more than a one dimension plan to achieve a goal, like a politician’s soundbite: “arm the rebels”; “deploy two brigades to Northern Iraq”; “capture ISIL’s oil fields in Syria”; “bomb Iranian nuclear installations”; “deploy nuclear armed missiles in Eastern Europe”; “maintain military bases in Afghanistan and Iraq for the foreseeable future”; “insert NATO or American troops into western Ukraine”; and so on. The real world context demands a multifaceted strategy that deploys the economic, political, psychological and military resources of a group of nations in support of a desired end. The American led European coalition has already taken up the battle against Russian aggression on its eastern border, not only propagandizing the revived threat of the Russian bear, but also imposing economic sanctions and uninviting the Russians from previously attended diplomatic conferences. But no NATO or American military are deployed in Ukraine. Likewise, the Administration has formed a coalition of more than sixty nations, including the Arab gulf nations, to degrade and eventually defeat ISIL, though without engaging the forces of Russia’s ally, Assad. Both strategies, then, are more focused on restoring peace and stability to Ukraine, Iraq, and Syria than on effectively countering Russia or its proxies. Also, both strategies show restraint in deploying military force and/or in supplying advanced armaments. This restraint and the obvious reluctance to confront Russia are intertwined, for they explain the limited military options in the Administration’s overall strategy. America and its allies in their attempt to address unrest in Eastern Europe and the Middle East are running afoul of Russia’s strategy to amplify or extend its sphere of influence. The question remains how willing is the Administration to confront Russia within its sphere of influence—i.e., militarily.

Some decades ago, President Kennedy was willing to engage Russia in a nuclear war when it endangered America and trespassed into our sphere of influence. Of course, I am referencing the Cuban missile crisis. Later, during Johnson’s Presidency, the foreign ministers of both Russia and America discussed possible tradeoffs within their respective spheres of influence. At the time, America was supporting the Republic of Vietnam against Communist aggression while Russia was supporting Communist North Korea in its continuing battle with its democratic neighbor to the south. In both Cuba and this later instance, the two super powers confronted each other through proxy nations, like pieces on a chessboard. (“I’ll trade my bishop for your rook.”) Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, its Russian remnant is still a nuclear armed nation under Putin, a man dedicated to restoring Russian influence, if not empire. His view of the world seems to be an anachronism of that earlier period, the Cold War. He has tried to align with Venezuela and Cuba in the Americas, but has been thwarted. As a result, he has to play with the pieces within his sphere of influence and counter an American response wherever he can. I think his overall strategy is obvious. But his tactics are opportunistic and, therefore, hard to predict. For example, he quickly volunteered to promote the divestment of Syrian chemical weapons in order to preempt President Obama’s eminent military intervention. He used the coup d’état in Kiev to intervene militarily in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Recently, when Assad’s command was reduced to less than one third of his country, he propped up Assad with Russian forces under the guise of joining allied forces against ISIL. Perhaps there is no effective strategy to stop Putin’s brand of opportunism except military confrontation. The West, under American leadership, is instead focused on the political restoration of the peoples of Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq, while eliminating the destabilizing effect of a nuclear armed Iran. Without the will to confront Russia’s military, how can the West effectively stop Putin’s expansionism or even play in his game.

When I served in Vietnam, I quickly learned how to avoid being stung by a scorpion. If you try to stomp the bugger, he’ll avoid your foot or die trying. In either case, you will be stung. But if you throw a cloth or paper over its head, it will immediately sting itself and die. Russia is like that scorpion. Under Putin’s leadership, it appears already blind to the possibility of overextending Russian resources and destabilizing the Russian economy. Putin cannot foresee and certainly cannot manage the chaos he has stirred either in Ukraine or now in Syria. Meanwhile, much like the weapons race during the Cold War, Putin is leading Russia into potential collapse. The risks he took in Crimea were minimal compared to what followed in eastern Ukraine. The risks he is taking in Syria are of an even greater magnitude for he will put Russian soldiers in the crosshairs of a civil war. He has so far proven right in his estimate that the West—specifically, America—does not have the will to fight Russia militarily outside NATO’s borders in Eastern Europe or in Syria. But his opportunism will bankrupt Russia and further isolate it as a pariah among the nations of the world. The best strategy when facing a scorpion is to keep your distance, blind it—or in Putin’s case, step aside the blind course he has chosen—and let it kill itself.

There is a caveat to what I have just written: nobody really knows what strategies are being undertaken, least of all me. For example, the reference I just made to discussions between foreign ministers of Russia and America was revealed to me in a memo from Eugene Rostow to President Johnson. That memo was declassified four decades after it was written. In the same batch of declassified material from that period was the revelation President Johnson had a back channel of communication with Ho Chi Minh many years before the Paris peace talks were initiated. I became aware of these facts as a result of the research I did for my first novel, “A Culpable Innocence.” My point here is that we have no way of knowing whether the Administration has had back channel communications with Assad or what happened in the private talks between Presidents Obama and Putin at the UN. Was their handshake a public gesture for press consumption or a sign of their agreement on some matter of policy? Maybe four decades from now we’ll know the truth.

To conclude: Putin is already blinded by his ambitions. The chaos he has stirred in Ukraine and Syria is more than he can shape. Though the Administration’s goals may not change, strategies will. What final strategy will win the day is a question still begging an answer.