A little more than a decade ago I spent the better part of a year researching the Vietnam War. What motivated me to do so? Did I feel the necessity to finally eradicate the psychological scar that war inflicted on me as one of its combatants? Did I believe that its conduct had not been treated fairly in spite of the mountainous material that had already been published and broadcast? Did I feel that I needed to understand better the context in which I and my fellow soldiers experienced that war in order to gain a more truthful perspective? Or did I think that the time for that perspective had only just arrived with the release of confidential documents 40 years after the war’s conclusion? Basically, my motivation was inspired by all of these questions, but especially by the latter. With the beginning of President Bush’s preemptive invasion of Iraq, I could not shake the image of President Johnson’s preemptive invasion of Na Nang, Vietnam, in 1965. Both invasions were justified on the basis of erroneous intelligence data—the alleged Gulf of Tonkin incident and the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction. Both wars resulted in a military occupation, the establishment of a sectarian government, and a violent insurgency that invited a counter invasion from a neighboring country to overthrow that government—in 1966 from North Vietnam and in 2014 from ISIL (Islamic State of the Levant, its more accurate pseudonym). Welcome to our present situation. Now we are once again engaged in a preemptive attack on a sovereign nation, based upon provocative, but unconvincing intelligence of any threat to our nation, and the prospect of instigating a terrorist response to the homeland (instead of an insurgency). At least we seem dedicated to precluding an American occupation which a large contingent of frontline combat soldiers would likely entail. Given that we American citizens might not know much about “actionable” intelligence and the resulting tactical maneuvers until nearly 40 years after-the-fact, what sense can we make of America’s response to ISIL?

I believe it is necessary to question what we are told about policy, goals, and tactics. It is not my intent to personalize an attack on the current administration. I do not believe that President Johnson, Bush, or Obama are warmongers or inveterate liars. But history clearly tells us that our Presidents can be led into a cul-de-sac not of their choosing. (Witness the standoff between Kennedy and Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis.) So, if my readers will allow me some license, let me question some of what we have been told about this latest American incursion in the Middle East.

➣ Our initial involvement was a series of airstrikes designed to protect American diplomats and free a Christian minority trapped on a mountain in Northern Iraq. The bombing continued after ISIL’s advance had been stopped and the refugees on Sinjar Mountain had been declared safe. What interests me is the pretext for this bombing. It is based upon two assumptions: the Kurds were not capable of defending their capital city and there were 40,000 homeless refugees on Sinjar. The former assumption was based upon the Kurds initial withdrawal from combat with ISIL; but we later found out that they were surprised, ran out of ammunition, and withdrew in order to regroup. The latter assumption became questionable when international aid workers finally landed on Sinjar and found only about 5,000 residents instead of refugees. Our State Department explained that apparently the refugees had already been evacuated by the Kurds under the cover of American airstrikes. These assumptions were presented as precursors for American involvement. But do they really represent our “Gulf of Tonkin moment”?

➣ Our President laudably declined to extend our bombing campaign until the Iraqis formed a more inclusive government. This was a brilliant diplomatic ploy, but to what purpose? The obvious answer is to preserve what American investment (to the tune of 1 trillion dollars) has created in the form of a titular republic in Iraq. Also, it was our stated intent to use Iraqi and Kurdish troops to combat ISIL in place of American “boots on the ground.” Their success, however, seemed much less secure unless the Sunnis in Northern Iraq identified with the government in Bagdad and joined forces with the Iraqi military. Therefore, removing Malicki and muting the advance of ISIL with American airpower are merely initial efforts to dismantle a terrorist group—the stated goal of this Administration. Or is there a deeper reason for our interest in saving Iraq from ISIL? In Vietnam, our overall strategic interest was stopping the so-called domino effect of Communist aggression. In the more recent Iraq war, we wanted to expand its contribution to the world oil market. Remember: Iraq still has the largest known reserves of oil in the world. This is a treasure trove the West will not hesitate to protect and to exploit. Today Iraq produces about 1 million barrels per day over its pre-war level. But that increased production has only offset the 1 million barrels per day that Iran has lost as a result of American sponsored sanctions. Now any threat to Iraqi reserves also exacerbates the West policy vis-à-vis Iran. In addition, it just happens to be the case that all of Iraqi oil is shipped to Europe which desperately wants to cut back its dependency on Russian gas and oil supplies even though it supports Iranian sanctions. . As a consequence, ISIL’s initial moves against oil rich Kirkuk and its capture of two oil refineries set off major alarms. Though the Iranians are engaged militarily in defense of Iraqi Shiites, expect them to use the disruptive potential of ISIL as a pretext to breach the imposed oil embargo with Europe and to take a much tougher stand in the ongoing nuclear proliferation negotiations with the United States. ISIL also creates problems for the Sunni Arab states because they want to assume the banner of the Islamic Caliphate. (There can only be one Islamic Caliphate according to Moslem tradition.) But how does this Caliphate declaration affect America? Why is ISIL more of a threat than the Islamic terrorist group in Africa that holds a broader swath of territory and also claims to be the Islamic Caliphate? Are we choosing to fight ISIL because it presents more of a danger to us than other terrorist groups in Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, or central Africa? By my humble estimate they all hate us about the same, though only al Qaeda seems to have the incentive and capability to harm us where we live. Perhaps we should be asking whether our fight with ISIL is more about preserving the production of Middle Eastern oil and our leverage with Iran in ongoing nuclear negotiations than any immediate terrorist threat to America. What is the primary reason for engaging ISIS at this time, rather than before?

➣ America under the leadership of President Obama is attempting to unite the “world” under a new doctrine of collective defense. The United Nations will likely be asked to authorize a collective military response against a non-state group in Syria which may present a threat to the West in the future. (Interestingly, nobody has asked for the collective defense of Ukraine against the present threat of Russian supported separatists.) Of course, the UN is not able to authorize such an action as long as Russia is a member of the Security Council. In fact, America has already expanded its air war into Syria with the support of some members of the Arab League before it even addressed the UN. But if our own Congress is unwilling to declare its support for the President’s initiative—which clearly exceeds the boundaries of his Constitutional authority– then it is understandable that he would seek some measure of international support. Like Woodrow Wilson before him, President Obama may be ahead of his time. The League of Nations died in its infancy, decades before the United Nations was resurrected after World War II. Our current President may be anticipating the Intergalactic Federation of the next century. Unfortunately, we do not as yet have a world body that can squelch bad actors before they wreak their havoc on sovereign entities. And America cannot function alone as the world police. In fact, I do not believe we do, except as a cover for our own state interest. The question here is whether gathering a coalition of nations and seeking some form of a UN mandate is any more than a diplomatic cover. The President has certainly put the “do-nothing-until-after-the-election” Congress on the spot. Is the President building on the Cheney-Bush doctrine of preemptive war? Or is he baiting a Congress that refused to grant him the authority to bomb Syria a year ago?

➣ And, finally, what is the purpose of training and equipping the supposedly moderate rebels in Syria to fight ISIL? For three years now we have claimed there was no moderate group trustworthy enough for anything more than American small arms. Several months ago a broadcast report aired an interview with rebels who had participated in clandestine, US sponsored military training exercises. They reported the training lasted only a few weeks, provided little more than shoulder rifles, and was felt to be totally inadequate for the actual combat they faced in Syria. The President has just asked Congress to provide half a billion dollars to expand this training and bring it into the light (meaning it will no longer be a CIA enterprise, but a fully funded program run by the Pentagon and monitored by Congress). But the program is projected to train only five thousand rebels in the course of a year. Obviously, this effort cannot fulfill the function the Administration has allocated to it. Not only is this trained cadre too small to confront ISIL and not available to deal with the immediate threat; but it would be hard pressed to focus on ISIL when its main adversary is the Assad government. So the obvious question is what is the purpose of this rebel training program? These newly minted moderate rebels may never become the “boots on the ground” fighting ISIL. Perhaps their mission is no more than the survival of a core faction America can support in some eventual diplomatic settlement with the Assad regime. From the beginning, the Administration has stated the civil war in Syria can only be resolved through some kind of political rapprochement. If there is some hidden diplomacy under the table, we may not be privy to its content and reach until some 40 years from now. But we can still question the stated objective of this training program.

Now that we are shrouded in the fog of war, there will be many unanswered questions and many tactical twists and turns that will further befuddle us. Nation states will contest and play by rules that would embarrass an honest and upright person. As I have stated elsewhere (“The Rule of the Primate”), war is a testimony to where we are in our evolution as primates. A nation state can do what an individual or private citizen would consider unconscionable. And yet that very same citizen can bask in the glory of a battle won, for he/she bears no accountability for the detritus of war. Herein are both the bane of nationalism and its appeal. At this moment in our history, perhaps the best that we can do to better our world and advance our evolution is to question the facades and absurdities of nation states. And we can continue to give voice to the hapless civilians who will be discounted as collateral damage in these inane contests for power and resources.