The enemy of our enemy is . . . well, still our enemy. How does the United States navigate through the dilemma posed by the Middle East? We could put two brigades on the ground in Northern Iraq and drive the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) into the ground. There are many in Washington and in the American press already leaning towards that option. We listened to that chorus once before, except in Afghanistan we stopped our ground troops at the Pakistani border and in Iraq unwittingly invited al Qaeda to join the disenfranchised and disempowered Sunni insurgency against the American invasion. Perhaps I am just part of the uninformed citizenry in this country, but I have learned something from history. For example, I know that the war in Vietnam could have been avoided if the American administration had simply signed the Geneva Treaty we had negotiated. That Treaty called for a nationwide plebiscite to determine the national leader of a united Vietnam. Also, more recent history has demonstrated that we invaded Iraq under false pretenses. In other words, those two wars—the most costly since World War II—were completely unnecessary and ended in unforeseen negative consequences. We lost nearly 60 thousand soldiers and absorbed over 250 thousand casualties into our VA system while eliminating over a million Vietnamese (mostly civilians). What we won was a Vietnam adversary for over four decades that only recently has begun to normalize relations with our country. In Iraq we spent many billions of dollars (over 2 billion still totally unaccounted for) and lost over five thousand solders while killing (according to UN estimates) over 100 thousand Iraqis (again, mostly civilians) and creating over one million homeless refugees. As a result, we flooded our VA system with thousands of wounded soldiers and found ourselves in support of a sectarian government in Iraq not only antagonistic to our military presence but to our foreign aid-supported pleas for moderation in dealing with the Sunnis and Kurds. In other words, we seem to have abetted the situation we now have in Iraq where the Sunnis, ostracized from power sharing, have welcomed back the latest incarnation of al Qaeda, led by a former al Qaeda operative and self-announced Caliph of a new terrorist state in the Levant. Of course, these results are the unintended consequences of American foreign policy. But they clearly point to the hazards imbedded in policy decisions regarding war and diplomacy. As far as I can determine, here are the options that appear to be before our President and Congress to date:

• As Senator McCain is wont to say, we can “bomb, bomb, bomb (fill in the country here) . . .” The President has already taken this option in Iraq, but only as a limited stopgap measure to halt the advance of ISIS and to enable humanitarian missions. All the military experts seem to agree that the only military option that would effectively drive ISIS out of Iraq involves troops on the ground. But the President is firmly against re-engaging American combat troops. Why? I suspect he is aware of the unintended consequences. Remember the Sunnis in North and West Iraq not only fought us during the last war, but also welcomed al Qaeda to join them in that fight. When General Petraeus negotiated to end the Sunni insurgency and effectively won the American exit from that war, he promised the Sunnis a stake in the governance of a free, democratic state of Iraq. That promise could not be kept. What would motivate the Sunnis to rise up against ISIS (like the so-called Sunni awakening of the last Iraq war) and to accept our military presence? There is evidence that they might be motivated to take the former action, but not the latter. A leading Sunni parliamentarian and outspoken anti-American has already indicated that the Sunnis would willingly drive out ISIS if the government in Bagdad would cease its suppression of Sunnis (basically the de-Baathification policies instituted by the American occupation and resurrected by PM Malicki), free Sunni political prisoners, and allow more local autonomy (perhaps similar to what the Kurds have). The President has already pushed the Iraqi government towards this Sunni position. His first move in that direction was to pressure the Iraqi parliament to oust Malicki and to form a unity government that would include Sunni and Kurds in positions of influence. While this process is underway, the President has provided US intelligence and Special Forces to support the Iraqi military in Ramadi and the Kurds’ Peshmurga in and around their capital city of Erbil. Although the Kurds are already in the fight, they have mainly pursued their own interest which includes protecting Erbil and winning control of Kirkuk, a city long disputed between the Kurds and the Shiites. For the Kurds to fight for all of Iraq, rather than declare their independence, they also will want a seat at the governance table and a resolution of their demands for control of Kirkuk and a fair share of the oil revenue taken from their lands. So the President’s stated policy of supporting indigenous combat troops has begun with the Peshmurga and, to a limited extent, the Iraqi army. But his ability to win over the Sunnis to that fight will depend upon the coming together of the Iraqi political factions. These are the stated policies of the American President to address the ISIS incursion into Iraq. Clearly, the option he has chosen does not include Americans leading the charge in combat, though any US military support mission does not preclude American casualties.
• Syria presents a different type of quagmire in that the Assad government is clearly at odds with America. The only foreign governments that have any influence with Damascus are Russia and Iran, with which we already have strained relations. Do we send troops into the mouth of the Syrian whale? It appears that Assad has set us up to be swallowed into his civil war; for he has deliberately directed his forces (at least until very recently) away from ISIS. Effectively, he has enabled ISIS to combat the other groups that oppose his regime. ISIS has, at the same time, legitimized his claim that he was fighting terrorists while his real intent was to crush his political adversaries. The problem we have in any strategy to push back ISIS is the fact that their command and control exists in Syria. The “hawks” and the press echo chamber have been clamoring about or for US bombing in Syria. When the President was asked about this possibility, he indicated he had no strategy to bomb Syria at this time, though he admitted he had asked for military options. He also said that if he decided on that course, he would consult with Congress beforehand. Is it not likely that he is considering the unintended consequences? Not only would there be collateral damage to civilians at our hands, but the main beneficiary of our bombing would be Assad’s brutal regime. There are also geopolitical considerations that further complicate any military involvement of America in Syria. For example, Saudi Arabia has been a strong financial supporter of Sunni jihadists in Syria (though they claim ISIS was not one of their satellites). Turkey has also been involved in the conflict by allowing jihadist entry into Syria across Turkey controlled borders. And, finally, since ISIS also goes by the name of ISL, the Islamic State of the Levant, their claimed area of control for their concocted Caliphate includes Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. The latter group tangentially, but still strategically, concerns Israel as well. The President’s foreign affairs team is well cognizant of these potential players of interest. The President has ordered his diplomatic team to scour the Middle East to discover the level of their support for whatever action can be taken against ISIS in Syria. What this means has yet to be determined. Could the countries of the Levant provide resources or even ground troops to capitalize on an American air campaign? Further, the President has widened his net to recruit a possible coalition of the willing by partnering with NATO and via a UN resolution that might authorize military action against ISIS. Personally, I cannot imagine any military action against ISIS in Syria without dealing with Assad. His actions demonstrate that he will never step down; and neither Russia nor Iran appears willing to urge him in that direction. But perhaps he could be persuaded to negotiate a truce with the moderates amongst his opposing forces. It would be a real coup for the West if an agreement on some sharing of power with the secular opposition could be reached with the current regime. However unlikely such an agreement might seem now, there is precedent in history. The bottom line: there is no ready available answer to the problem of ISIS in Syria. Simply bombing them there would not eliminate them. Sending American combat troops into Syria would pull us into a civil war with totally unpredictable results. A diplomatic solution without the involvement of Assad does not appear probable. Some form of outside pressure from the UN and Middle Eastern countries, possibly with the threat of a combined military threat, might provide a viable approach to the “ISIS in Syria” conundrum. Apparently, the President’s team is exploring this approach. But, like the Ukraine puzzle, there are no simple answers when players like Putin or Assad are involved. We have seen their like before. Unfortunately, they tend to take down their country with them.

At the outset of this review, I indicated what options appear to be before the President AND Congress. As befits this Congress, their voice has not been heard, other than a few snarky remarks about the deficiencies in the President’s approach or in his words taken out of context. In other words, our elected officials are playing politics while the State Department and the President take all the heat. The press has tried to take up the debate, but it does not have the Constitutional authority of Congress to crystallize policy. Moreover, the press does not have access to the intelligence, briefings, and internal policy debates within the Administration. Congress has both access to this information and oversight responsibility as our representatives. And, finally, only Congress has the Constitutional authority to wage war if, in fact, our military intervention in Syria is the option considered. So the image of a President “playing the fiddle as Rome burns” is not what I see. Instead, before an expectant and silent audience I see an orchestra in which every musician left their instruments at home. That silence is indeed deafening.